

Homer to Solon: The Rise of the Polis

The Written Sources

KURT A. RAAFLAUB

(Respondent: MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN)

I begin with three statements, ranging in date from the middle or late eighth to the early sixth centuries.¹ First, Hektor's battle cry in the *Iliad*:

So fight by the ships, all together. And he among you / who meets his death and destiny,
speared or stabbed,/ let him die! He has no dishonour when he dies defending / his
fatherland (*patre*), for then his wife shall be saved and his children afterwards,/ and his
house and property shall not be damaged – once the Achaeans / go away with their ships...
(15.494-99)

Second, Tyrtaios: The man who fights fearlessly among the *promachoi* “is a common good (*xynon esthlon*) for the community (*polis*) and all the people (*demos*).” If he dies “he brings great honor to the community (*asty*) and the people (*laoi*) and his father.”

Such a man is lamented alike by the young and the elders / and all his *polis* goes into mourning and grieves for his loss./ His tomb is pointed to with pride, and so are his children,/ and his children's children, and afterwards all his *genos*... / But if he escapes the doom of death,... and wins his battle,... / all men give place to him alike, the youth and the elders.../ Aging, he has reputation among his citizens. (9D = 12W)

Third, Solon:

This our *polis* will never be destroyed by the planning / of Zeus, nor according to the wish of the immortal gods;/ such is she who, great hearted, mightily fathered, protects us,/ Pallas Athene, whose hands are stretched out over our heads./ But the citizens (*astoi*) themselves in their wildness are bent on destruction / of their great *polis*.../ So my spirit dictates to me: I must tell the Athenians / how many evils a *polis* suffers from *Dysnomie*,/ and how *Eunomie* displays all neatness and order... (3D = 4W)

Each of these statements is separated from the preceding by roughly one half to three quarters of a century. They seem to indicate a progression in the individual's relationship to his community. In dying for his *patre*, Hektor says, the soldier saves his house and family. Clearly, to this fighter his *oikos* is at least as important as the community. In Tyrtaios the

community, facing no less serious outside danger, takes center stage; the poet focuses on its collective feelings and actions; here the family appears to be secondary. Finally, in Solon's case, the threat to the community comes from within; the poet, directly representing the community itself, addresses his audience in their function as citizens. Thus he even speaks in the collective first person: our polis, we! Of course, the progression is not as straight and simple as that, neither in historical reality nor in the extant sources. Moreover, throughout the archaic and classical periods, concern for family and community remained intertwined in the fighting soldiers' thinking. I cite as a monumental example the battle cry of the Greek sailors and marines at Salamis (according to Aesch. *Persae* 402-5, tr. Vellacott):

Forward, you sons of Hellas! Set your country (*patris*) free!
 Set free your sons, your wives, tombs of your ancestors,
 and temples of your gods. All is at stake: now fight!

Nevertheless, a marked progression toward a stronger emphasis on the community is undeniable, and it makes eminent sense that in our surviving evidence Solon appears as the first explicit spokesperson for the polis.

My first problem concerns the existence and developmental stage of the polis in the times and societies described by Homer and Hesiod (the "early polis" in the late eighth and early seventh centuries) – a vexed issue which is in need of some systematic rethinking. I shall then analyze the sources illuminating the "integration of the polis" in the seventh and sixth centuries, and end with some general thoughts on the rise of the polis. Before I turn to Homer, however, a few preliminary remarks are necessary.

1. Preliminary remarks

First, I am not concerned with the question of whether and to what extent the polis was a state and when it might have reached statehood.² Nor shall I try to translate "polis": both "city" or "city-state" are seriously misleading.³ Lacking a reasonable alternative, I shall use "polis" as a technical term throughout this paper, indicating with *polis* (italicized) the Greek word as it appears in the sources.

Second, while this solution eliminates modern connotations inherent in "city" and "state", it does not in itself establish conceptual clarity. For

the word *polis* existed for many centuries before our earliest literary sources allow us to examine terms and concepts more reliably. Although it is uncertain whether *ptolis* is in fact attested in the Mycenaean Linear B tablets, it undoubtedly is a very old Indo-European word for “stronghold, citadel,” belonging to the “Achaean” background of the epic language.⁴ If, as thus seems not unlikely, *ptolis* was used by the Mycenaeans, the word would be one of several social terms (such as *demos*, *basileus*, *eleutheros*, *doulos* and perhaps *asty*) proving terminological continuity from the Bronze to the Archaic Ages. Such unquestionable linguistic continuities have prompted some scholars to assume a high degree of continuity in content as well.⁵ Caution is in order, however. While it is quite probable that terms such as *demos* and *polis* were used continually to designate communities and settlements (or parts thereof), it is certain that in the course of several centuries such communities underwent drastic changes. Accordingly, the meaning of these terms will have changed massively as well. Certainly in Mycenaean Greek *ptolis* would have designated the citadel. This meaning of *polis*, though attested epigraphically, is extremely rare in archaic and classical Greek literature and, interestingly, missing in Homer. As Emile Benveniste observes, we have here “an old Indo-European term, which in Greek, and only in Greek, has taken on the sense of ‘town, city,’ then ‘state.’”⁶ As a consequence, the history of the Greek polis begins for us, not with the Mycenaean *ptolis* but with the Homeric *polis* and its immediate antecedents as far as we are able to glean them from the epics themselves.⁷

Third, in investigating the rise of the polis, we are dealing not with an event but with a process that continued over several centuries. Our scarce written sources offer only intermittent glimpses at the decisive phase of this process (from the eighth to the early sixth centuries), illuminating different stages and conditions in a wide variety of places. Archaeological evidence is accumulating rapidly, providing us with immensely valuable information about changes in population density, settlement distribution and structure, subsistence and trade, social differentiation, and much more (see n. 1). But the rise of the polis entails more than this: it is the history of a relationship between peoples and their communities. To understand this, we need the help of written sources.

Fourth, to trace the rise of the polis means to investigate the evolution of a known entity from its unknown origins through its barely recognizable early stages to its fully developed and well-known form. Thus at least a working definition of “polis” is indispensable. In view of the great

number and variety of poleis existing at any given time, such a definition inevitably is somewhat abstract, approaching an “ideal type”.⁸ What constituted a polis was not necessarily independence nor the existence of a city or town and the unity of urban center and territory – although both factors were important in most cases – because dependent communities did not necessarily cease to be considered poleis, and there were poleis without cities, poleis with several towns and even poleis without territory;⁹ moreover, the city did not create, it presupposed the polis. Rather, the polis was a community of persons or, more precisely, citizens (a “Personenverband” or “Bürgerverband”), of place or territory, of cults, customs and laws, and a community that was able to administer itself (fully or partly). Among these factors, the community of citizens was primary; Aigina was a place: a town, an island; the polis was “the Aiginetans”. *Andres polis*, says Thucydides: “the men are the polis” (7.77.7; cf. Alkaios 426 LP, Campbell; Her. 8.61). Thus, as W.G. Runciman stresses, “a *polis* is a type of society for which the proper label is not ‘city-state’ but ‘citizen-state’.”¹⁰ The mentality and loyalty of the citizens – their sense of community and identification with it – were more important than external features such as urban architecture. For the same reason, as the Phokaians (Her. 1.163-68) and many others demonstrated, the polis was movable. In addition, on both the communal and private levels, the polis was defined by emotional elements that could not be replaced or recreated easily; they are best expressed in the battle cry of Salamis cited above.

Fifth, the Homeric epics provide perilous ground for social analysis. My own interpretation is based on the following considerations. (a) The epics are neither historical nor sociological or anthropological treatises. But they provide much information about social issues. Whether or not these epics were produced by the same poet, they are chronologically close to each other (second half of the eighth century, the *Iliad* about one generation earlier than the *Odyssey*) and thus can and should be examined together. Furthermore, despite more marked differences in genre, purpose and outlook, Hesiod’s poems still are close enough chronologically and in overall experience to provide a useful complement.¹¹

(b) Whatever the mechanisms of their ultimate fixation (see n. 15), all these epics are based on an old tradition of oral composition, performance and transmission.¹² In the course of constant re-performance and re-interpretation by generations of singers, their content was transformed and adapted to changing conditions and the experiences and expectations of changing audiences – both (though more slowly) on the level of

events and actions, and (more rapidly) on that of social life and interaction. Even on the latter level, which concerns us here, the epics present, to some extent, an amalgam, combining conditions and memories of different periods. But the combined weight of such memories, anachronisms and archaisms is relatively insignificant – if compared with the large bulk of the material used to depict the social background and environment, in which the heroes act out their heroic deeds, and which, in contrast to the events and persons, is not marked or emphasized. This background description is not entirely but sufficiently consistent to allow us to recognize a society that makes sense from an anthropological perspective and can be fitted into a scheme of social evolution among early societies. Thus this society must have existed in time and space outside of the epics. The place most likely was Ionia. Given what comparative research has taught us about the characteristics of oral poetry, on the one hand, this society must be dated close enough to the poet's own time to allow recognition and identification by his audience – a crucial factor in the poet-audience-interaction typical of such poetry. On the other hand, we need to take into account both a natural lag-time for adjustments and a conscious effort on the poet's part to preserve what James Redfield calls the "epic distance";¹³ in other words, the social background of heroic poetry needs to be "modern" enough to be understandable but archaic enough to be believable. Thus, I suggest, "Homeric society" is to be dated within the time-span that could be covered by the audience's collective memory, that is, at the very most three generations or one century before the poet's own time: in the late ninth and early eighth centuries.¹⁴ In contrast to earlier, more static periods, this was a time of profound and rapid change. More than is usually the case, therefore, the old and new overlapped and coexisted, and this in itself may account for much of what in the epics appears to us inconsistent or contradictory.¹⁵

(c) The epics typically combine, on the one hand, traditional components firmly embedded in the story and outlook of heroic poetry but alien to the experience or memories shared by poet and audience with, on the other hand, elements from their world of experience that are needed to fill out the picture. A good example of such "poetic distortion" is provided by the description of fighting and battle formations in the *Iliad*. Our understanding of the apparently inconsistent picture might be facilitated if we recognized as part of the problem the poet's need to combine two heterogeneous elements: the traditional emphasis on heroic fighting, which, though not corresponding to the reality known by an eighth-century audience, was poetically attractive and dramatically effective

(single combat, extended heroic *aristeiai*, and the use of chariots), and “filling material”, which naturally was taken from a real world that *was* familiar to this audience (mass combat in close formations: see below at n.48).

(d) Finally, the epics represent poetic art of the highest order. The poet does not tell us all he knows; he selects and emphasizes according to his own dramatic and interpretative purposes. This factor of “poetic selection” is often underestimated: not all that the poet does not emphasize is unimportant or nonexistent in Homeric society. For example, the *Odyssey* is concerned with a hero’s homecoming and his efforts to regain control in his *oikos*. Although the community is deeply affected by these events, the poet’s primary attention rests on this *oikos*. Thus the community of Ithaka remains in the background. This does not mean, however, that this particular community was unimportant, undeveloped or even hardly existing; nor does it mean, more generally, that the *oikos* was the only social entity that counted for “Homeric” people. Both these conclusions have been drawn by many scholars. It only means that for traditional and artistic reasons the poet chose to focus on Odysseus’ *oikos*. Frequent hints and passing remarks reveal, though, that in the poet’s imagination this *oikos* is no less part of a community than Alkinoos’ and Menelaos’, and in book 2 its assembly appears in the limelight.

2. The Early Polis (Eighth/Early Seventh Centuries)

a. The Polis in Homer

“Cities” and *poleis* are frequent and prominent in both epics. I shall first establish a typology of such communities, then use my working definition of “polis” to determine to what extent the “Homeric polis” corresponds to this general model. This will provide a solid foundation for assessing the concepts associated with the polis and for defining the place of the polis in Homeric society.

Four communities stand out among all the others. The *Iliad* is dominated by two of these: Troy and the fortified camp of the Achaians. With few exceptions, the actions narrated in the epic take place in these communities and in the plain between them. First, Troy is described and characterized with great care, but few details are singled out: its massive “sacred” walls shelter the permanent inhabitants and a large number of allies; the Skaian Gate connects this protected space with the plain, its

tower serves as lookout. The *agora* is near the palace of Priamos and the houses of his most important sons. On the citadel rise the temples of Apollo and Athena. The plain and the foothills of Mount Ida, Troy's territory, are now deserted but in past times of peace offered pastures for herds and were covered with fields and orchards.¹⁶ This community has a history: it was founded¹⁷ by Priamos' ancestor when the people moved from the foothills of Ida to the edge of the plain. Priamos' family has since held the leadership and expects to continue to do so if this war can be won (20. 215-40; cf. 179-83 and 6. 476-79). Priamos is the undisputed political leader but has yielded the military command to Hektor. Assemblies take place in Troy (7. 345-79) and, among the soldiers, in the field (8. 489-542; 18. 243-313; cf. the council of the leaders: 10. 298-332; 13. 741f.); there are occasional allusions to a council of "leaders" or "elders of the people" (*hegetores, demogerontes*: 3. 146-53; cf. 15. 720-23).

Second, by contrast, the fortified camp sheltering the Achaians is a temporary community. Its walls have been erected hastily, without sacrifice – hence they are not sacred – and it will leave no trace after the Achaians' departure (7. 336-43, 433-63; 12. 3-35). It is a community without history and future beyond the immediate purpose of its existence. It is also a community without wives and children (15. 661-66),¹⁸ without a territory and without supportive neighbors (15. 735-41). Quite correctly, therefore, it is called *stratos* (e.g., 15. 657; 16. 73), never *polis* or *asty*, and the accommodations, though in some cases quite elaborate, are not *domata* but *klisiai* (huts: e.g., 15. 656 and esp. 24. 448-56). In every other respect, however, this community is structured like any other, both physically and politically:¹⁹ it is eventually surrounded by a ditch and wall with several gates (12. 3-35, 50-57, 119f., 175); the ships and shelters are arranged in rows (14. 29-36), according to contingents, and separated by "many paths" (10. 66); the *agora*, site of several assemblies within a few days, and the altars of the gods are located near the ships of Agamemnon and Odysseus, presumably in the center (7. 382f.; 8. 222-26, 249f.; 11. 805-7), and there is a market for trade with foreign merchants (7. 467). The council of the leaders meets before an assembly or independently (2. 53-85; 7. 313-43; 9. 12-173; 10. 195-253; 14. 1-134), often hosted by Agamemnon who is overall leader, acknowledged as such by all but not unchallenged in his decisions.

The existence of this improvised city, which reaches its fully developed form rather suddenly in the tenth year, poses difficult questions.²⁰ Two interrelated aspects seem particularly important to our present inquiry. The sudden building of the walls around the Achaian camp, motivated

by Achilles' withdrawal (cf. 9. 349f.), enables the poet to include in his "wrath poem" an extended and highly dramatic wall-battle (*teichomachia*), that is, the storming of a city which, in the case of Troy, is excluded from the poem by its limited time frame.²¹ By this same device the Trojan War could essentially be fitted into the model, familiar to poet and audience, of a war between neighboring communities.²² Here again we find the "poetic amalgamation", mentioned earlier, of traditional elements and contemporary reality.

Third, after his painful adventures among various societies in an unreal *Märchenwelt* – societies which all in different ways provide a negative contrast to normal human societies²³ – Odysseus reaches the community of the Phaiakians on the island of Scheria. This too is a *Märchenland*, but its difference is positive: it is an ideal type of community, living in a golden age setting between gods and humans and between fiction and reality.²⁴ This community is described in considerable detail. Around the main settlement is

a towering wall (*pyrgos*), and a handsome harbor either side of the *polis*, and a narrow causeway, and along the road there are oarswept ships drawn up, for they all have slips, one for each vessel; and there is the *agore*, put together with quarried stone, and built around a fine precinct of Poseidon. (6. 262-67; cf. 7. 43-45; 8. 5-7)

This precinct, called Posideion (6. 266), certainly is a *temenos* with an altar, perhaps one of the temples built when the *polis* was founded (6.10).²⁵ Inside the walls are the homes of the Phaiakians, in particular the splendid house of Alkinoos with its miraculous garden (6. 298-302; cf. 7. 84-132). Alkinoos' estate (*temenos*) and another orchard or garden are outside the walls, in shouting distance, near a grove of poplars sacred to Athena and a spring (291-94). The community's territory seems to comprise the entire island, including some mountains in the distance (5. 279f.).

Alkinoos is *basileus*, as his father was (6. 11f.; 7. 62f.), but there are twelve *basileis* beside him (8. 390f.). They meet and are entertained in Alkinoos' house (6. 53-55, 60f.; 7. 98f.; 8. 41f.), and they preside over meetings of the assembly and other communal events (8. 4-45, 109ff.). Finally, this community, like Troy, has a specific history: Alkinoos' father led the Phaiakians to Scheria, when the Cyclopes, their former neighbors, made life intolerable for them. He settled them on the island "and drove a wall around the *polis* and built houses and erected temples of the gods, and allotted the fields" (6. 4-10). This foundation story most

likely reflects the experience of eighth-century colonization;²⁶ Scheria therefore represents the idealized picture of a community of that time.

Fourth, Ithaka, the community in the shadow: its territory comprises the whole island; Odysseus owns land in some distance from the main settlement (e.g., 15. 504-6; 17. 25; cf. 14. 95-104), while the farm of his father, Laërtes, lies close by (24. 205). Odysseus' house is a large farmhouse, similar to, but much less extravagantly decorated than Alkinoos'; it is situated in the town (e.g., 16. 130f., 150f., 169f.; 17. 5-17), as are those of the suitors (18. 419-28). There is a harbor (16. 321-25) and an *agore* with permanent seats, serving as meeting place for formal assemblies and informal gatherings (see below). Walls and sanctuaries are not mentioned, but there is a grove with a spring right outside the town (17. 204-11).

These four communities are by no means identical. Apart from certain anomalies mentioned before (temporary nature, *Märchenland*), the main settlement of the Phaiakians is a harbor town on a peninsula, while Troy with its citadel rises in the background of a large coastal plain. Ithaka is mountainous and unsuitable for horsebreeding (4. 601-8; 9. 21-27), while Scheria and Troy are blessed with fertile plains. In Troy the aged leader is still in charge but has handed over the military command to his eldest son, while in Ithaka he has yielded all his functions to his son and withdrawn from public life.²⁷ Nor are all the essential features present or mentioned in every case. Nevertheless, in various combinations these communities share certain important elements that allow us to create a composite picture.²⁸ The typical Homeric community comprises territory and main settlement. The latter, often walled, features sanctuaries (shrines or temples), an *agora* (often with permanent seats at least for the leaders), and the homes of the inhabitants, including the large house of the overall leader (*basileus*), where the other *basileis* meet and are entertained. This council meets quite frequently, while an assembly is convened whenever important issues need to be discussed.

It is this type of community for which the epics use the terms *demos*, *polis*, *asty*.²⁹ *Demos*, meaning both "land, district" and "people", describes the largest conceivable social unit, the outermost limit of belonging and community; beyond it there are personal and communal relationships of friendship and alliance but no shared community. *Gaia* (land) and *patre* (fatherland) are often used synonymously with *demos* and *polis*. *Polis* in turn is sometimes linked with *demos* in formulas (such as *demon te polin te*) expressing the communal unity of people and territory. *Polis* appears interchangeably with *asty* as the term for the main settlement but, unlike

asty, *polis* can also describe the larger political community (the “state”), comprising both town and territory.³⁰ Thus Odysseus asks Nausikaa (*Od.* 6. 177f.; cf. 191-95) about the people (*anthropoi*), who live in (hold) this land (*gaia*) and community (*polis*), and about the way to the town (*asty*); Glaukos wants Hektor to tell him how he plans to save his *polis* and *asty* (*Il.* 17. 144). Equally interchangeably, the inhabitants of *polis* and *asty* are called *politai* and *astoi*, while *laos* or *laoi*, originally denoting a group of warriors and followers of a chief, in our epics are mostly equivalent with *demos*, people. Due to its original meaning, however, *laos/laoi* cannot, but *demos* can, include the elite. These, the heads of the largest and richest *oikoi*, are the *basileis*. The same or possibly a somewhat larger group is described functionally as leaders, councilors or elders (*protoi*, *hegetores*, *medontes*, *gerontes*).³¹ Despite differences in wealth, power of the *oikos*, personal qualities, and influence, these men form a fiercely competitive group of equals among whom the paramount *basileus* holds an inherited, though precarious, position of preeminence as *primus inter pares*.³²

The communities discussed above, then, are prime examples of Homeric *poleis*. Presumably all the other *poleis* referred to by name or term are imagined to correspond to the same model. Indeed, the world envisaged by the epics is full of such *poleis*. Many are mentioned in the *Iliad* because they fall victim to Achilles’, the “city-sacker’s” (*ptoliporthos*) relentless raids during the first nine years of the war, and in the *Odyssey* because Telemachos and Odysseus visit them. Indeed, Odysseus is the archetype of a man who has seen the *astea* of many peoples (n.30). The foreign visitor is asked to identify himself by *gaia*, *demos* and *polis* (*Od.* 8. 555) or by *polis* and parents (e.g., 1. 170; 14. 187). In addition, *poleis* feature prominently in similes and on the shield of Achilles (*Il.* 18, 490-540), mirroring the main dimensions of human life and experience. The natural assumption therefore is that people live in *poleis*, and all important figures (at least in the human world) are indeed connected with a *polis*. Central elements of the epic action take place in a *polis*, mostly in and around its fortified town, and, as Stephen Scully has demonstrated, the crucial function and symbolic significance of the “city” in life and thought of Homeric society is emphasized by a great variety of associations.³³

To what extent, then, does this polis correspond to the classical, fully developed model of the polis, as it was defined above? For some components of this definition the answer is fairly simple. The meanings of *demos* and *polis* show that this polis is a community of space and territory. Communal shrines and temples (mentioned earlier), and communal sac-

rifices or rituals (for example, *Il.* 6. 286-311; *Od.* 3. 4-8) mark it as a community of cult. It certainly is a community of customs. Although there are no written laws, great importance is attributed to observing *themis* (traditional and generally accepted norms of behavior) and *dike* (procedural justice). One of the main functions of the *basileis* is the settling of disputes; in this function – as in that of speaker in the assembly – they hold the staff as sign of an authority that is derived from Zeus, the ultimate protector of justice (*Il.* 2. 101-9; cf. 18. 497-508; *Od.* 3. 406-12). Thus the Homeric polis is a community with a shared concern for customary norms and fair procedure, that is, for justice.³⁴ Furthermore, the poleis we have studied are independent, self-administered communities.³⁵

But is the Homeric polis also, in more than the most superficial sense, a community of persons or citizens?³⁶ Is it more than a loose agglomeration of largely autonomous *oikoi*, which many scholars consider the primary, not only social and economic, but also organizational and psychological units in this society? That is, to what extent is this polis an integrated community with a collective will and collective ability to act, and with a developed sense of communal solidarity and loyalty? And to what extent does such communal thinking and acting transcend the collaboration necessary for survival in times of extreme emergency? Such questions naturally concern a relatively developed stage of the polis, and thus probably one closest in time to the poet and his audience. They concern also the most unheroic aspects of “Homeric society”, most likely to be affected by the principles, discussed earlier, of “poetic selection” and “epic distance”. Beyond the examples mentioned before (emphasis in battle descriptions on individual exploits rather than mass combat, focus on Odysseus’ *oikos* rather than the polis of Ithaca: see above, end of section 1), we see these principles at work in other areas as well. For example, the second half of the eighth century witnessed the beginning of organized communal warfare and wars for the control of land. Such wars did not displace rivalries and raids among poleis and warrior bands, but, where they occurred, they confronted the communities involved with a serious threat to their subsistence or even existence. Nevertheless, this new reality seems excluded from the epics, which prefer the traditional heroic themes of wars about cattle, booty, or a beautiful woman.³⁷ The same period saw the rise of panhellenic sanctuaries, new forms of interstate relations and a gradual formalization of aristocratic leadership, including perhaps elected and rotating offices. Instead of all this, the epics generally preserve somewhat earlier structures and forms of in-

teraction, emphasizing wherever possible the dominant role of the heroic individual. This even applies to the polis itself. Although the Phaiakian community recognizably is modelled after a contemporary colony with its harbor town, as a city it is incomplete: the poet largely omits the residential quarters and the busy sphere of daily life in such a town; instead he focuses on the public sphere, the grand house of the leader and the events that involve his family and his public function. It is as if the poet described the old world of a chief and his followers in the new setting of a polis.³⁸ For our purposes, however, it is crucial that this new setting is clearly visible. Overall, bits and pieces of the new realities “peek through” quite often; put together, they betray a considerable sense of a developed and coherent community.

a) As said before, the polis comprises both territory and town. The concept of “territoriality”, according to Anthony Snodgrass an important indicator of the emergence of the polis, though not emphasized, thus may be assumed to be in existence.³⁹ The polis is the largest unit of belonging; the individual is identified by family *and* polis. Even the Achaian contingents at Troy in the famous “Catalogue of Ships” (2. 484-760) are distinguished, not only by their leader’s name and an ethnic, regional or local indication of origin, as we should expect if we were dealing mainly with groups of followers; the catalogue also lists in great detail the settlements or poleis in each group’s homeland.⁴⁰

(b) The Homeric polis’ main settlement features two types of conspicuous monuments (temples and walls), which, if historically accurate (i.e., contemporary with “Homeric society”) and not primarily the product of ancient Mycenaean or Near-Eastern influences and thus essentially of poetic fiction, would seem to indicate major collective efforts. Monumental, free-standing temples of the type mentioned in the description of Troy and the Phaiakian town are characteristic neither of Bronze Age Greece nor of Near-Eastern cities. But their appearance in post-Mycenaean Greece is dated securely to the late eighth century in an increasing number of places. This phenomenon is generally recognized as important archaeological evidence for the rise of the polis – although by themselves these temples do not give us sufficient information about the social and political conditions that brought them into existence. In combination with other evidence, however, we may conclude that they reflect truly communal efforts⁴¹ rather than mainly those of one or several outstanding leaders and their oikoi, and that they largely represent new beginnings rather than simply continuity on a much more lavish level.⁴²

By contrast, walls and the motif of fighting around walls are attested

for both the Mycenaean period and the ancient Near East. The description of the sacred walls of Troy and the epic theme of storming such walls may partly be inspired by such traditions. Moreover, such walls, surrounding the entire settlement rather than only the citadel, so far are documented archaeologically in extremely few cases of the eighth century.⁴³ Several observations, however, are noteworthy. The walls of both Scheria and the Achaian camp partly consist of wooden palisades and superstructures comparable to those actually found in Old Smyrna. Scheria represents a colonial polis; in the report of its foundation (*Od.* 6. 4-10: above at n.26) the building of walls around the polis is mentioned as an integral part of establishing a colony; thus in the colonial world city-walls may have appeared more frequently at an earlier period than in the old Greek territories. One of the cities on the shield of Achilles, which generally is assumed to reflect conditions close to the poet's own time, is walled as well (*Il.* 18. 514); here as in the defense of Troy the poet betrays close and natural familiarity with the use of such walls in inter-city warfare – more perhaps, as the famous case of the chariots suggests, than could be acquired through fossilized memories of a distant past or the spotty information obtained from foreign lore; such knowledge more likely is grounded in contemporary experience. The question thus remains open; archaeology may in this respect still limp behind.⁴⁴

In any case, even if city-walls were more frequent in the eighth century than we presently think, they hardly were regular features of “the” early polis, and we seem well advised not to count city-walls among the criteria for the formation of the polis. Again, however, the question must be asked what precisely this signifies for the rise of the polis. As Snodgrass writes, “The long delay in building city-walls round even the most famous mainland poleis, or even, as at Sparta, their permanent absence, is a matter of record.”⁴⁵ Certainly, but such negative evidence needs to be explained no less than the positive evidence. We know very little about the nature of warfare and competition among the emerging poleis. The case of Sparta may not have been as unique as it appears to us from the point of view of our fifth-century sources. Even much later, hoplite warfare was remarkably formalized and contained a strong ritual component; thus communities may have relied more on their citizen army than on walls to decide competitions with their neighbors.⁴⁶ In addition, depending on local conditions, many poleis may have found it sufficient to repair existing (Mycenaean) fortifications around the acropolis or even build new ones on such a limited scale.⁴⁷

(c) The battle descriptions in the *Iliad* (see also above, after n. 15)

contain a large amount of evidence for mass combat in relatively dense battle formations. The conclusion seems inevitable that we are dealing, if not with an early form of the hoplite phalanx, at least with its immediate precursor. Some of the images (e.g., 13. 130-34; 16. 212-17) are strikingly close to those of Tyrtaios (8D = 11W. 29-34), who is generally believed to sing about the phalanx. The experience behind these images thus must be similar.⁴⁸ At any rate, there is no question that in the *Iliad* the common soldiers are fully involved in the fighting and, though less conspicuously than the heroes, share the responsibility for victory and defeat.⁴⁹

The Achaian army consists of a large number of contingents from all over Greece, assembled by their leaders in support of their overall leader, Agamemnon. But under this surface we glimpse traces of a different reality: the contingents are not just follower groups, they are primarily affiliated with specific peoples and poleis (above at n.40). At least in one place the community (*demos*) is involved in selecting the leaders of such a contingent (*Od.* 14. 237-39). The conception of the Achaian camp as a temporary fortified city adapts the war to a feud between neighboring poleis, which must have been all too familiar to poet and audience (above at n.22).⁵⁰

In such wars all able-bodied and properly equipped men would help defend their own community or overpower the other. These wars indeed were communal affairs, greatly enhancing cohesion, solidarity and shared responsibility in the polis. The connection, typical of the developed polis, between land ownership, military capacity, and citizenship or political rights, must have existed already in this Homeric polis, albeit in an undeveloped and unformalized way.⁵¹ If so, this has great importance for our understanding of subsequent developments. For example, it effectively eliminates the much-discussed "hoplite revolution" from the historical scene: there was no revolution, only an evolution, starting on a more advanced level than is usually assumed.⁵² The same phenomenon goes far in explaining the relatively small gap between the mass of free farmers and the elite of wealthy landowners, emphasized in recent scholarship, and the latter's difficulties in establishing themselves as a sharply defined aristocracy, separated by effective class barriers from the rest of the population.⁵³

(d) Most scholars consider the Homeric assembly insignificant and powerless: the assembled masses can only shout their approval or disapproval; only the members of the elite are entitled to speak; and at the end the leaders or the paramount leader do what they want anyway. This view, however, is contradicted by some crucial facts.⁵⁴ First, some of

these assemblies, whatever their outcome, are formalized to a considerable degree; they are convened by the herald's announcement, the "right" to speak is determined by status, rank and experience, and the speaker assumes a position of high communal authority by holding the leader's staff.⁵⁵ Second, an assembly is called and public discussion arranged in a polis, an army or a band of warriors whenever an important issue requires debate and decision. Informal assemblies of smaller or larger groups meet at various occasions, and it seems perfectly normal for Telemachos, as for the *basileus* of the Laistrygonians and other nobles, to spend time in the *agora* (*Od.* 20. 146; cf. 10. 114f.; 6. 53-55; 15. 466-68). The assembly thus is a traditional institution, deeply ingrained in the social structures out of which the polis developed. Third, normally the leader makes conscious efforts to convince the assembly (thus the great importance attributed, among the leader's qualities, to persuasive speaking⁵⁶) and, although there is no formal vote, respects the people's opinion. If he refuses to do so and fails in executing his plan, he is liable to censure and makes himself vulnerable.⁵⁷ Fourth, the assembly has an important function in witnessing and legitimizing communal actions and decisions, from the distribution of booty to the resolution of conflicts.⁵⁸ Thus overall, though without the right of initiative, free speech and vote – restrictions which are typical of most ancient societies anyway – the assembly plays a crucial role that should not be underestimated. Fifth, much of this is true for the council of *basileis* as well. It is convened and consulted frequently by the paramount *basileus*, whether before an assembly or separately. In peace and at war, the *basileis* spend much time in consultation and at common meals.⁵⁹ The *Iliad* describes several council debates: there is, among a highly competitive elite of roughly equals, a recognizable hierarchy of speaking, exceptions are explained carefully; the *basileis* consider it their duty to challenge the paramount leader, and he is expected to follow the best advice or the shared opinion of the others.⁶⁰ Finally, assembly and council are seen as such normal methods of communal interaction that quite naturally they are attributed to divine society as well: although this society is equivalent, not to a polis but to a family or an *oikos*, the gods are imagined to meet in assembly whenever an issue needs to be discussed, decided upon, or simply announced.⁶¹

(e) There are indications of a distinction between public and private and of the emergence of a public sphere. Thus the assembly deals only with public matters (*Od.* 2. 30-32, 42-44); Telemachos has to demonstrate that the troubles of his *oikos* (an entirely private problem) affect the well-being of the whole community and therefore are of concern to the

assembly (2. 45-79). One of the first questions a noble visitor answers is whether he is travelling on public or private business (3. 82; 4. 314). Odysseus recalls a public mission he undertook, sent by his father and the other *gerontes*, to recover 300 sheep and their shepherds stolen from Ithaka by some Messenians (21. 16-21): he went to retrieve “a debt (*chreios*) owed him [as the representative of the *demos* of Ithaka] by the entire *demos* [of Messenia]” (21. 17). In other words, the *demos* of Messenia is held responsible by the *demos* of Ithaka for the crime committed by some Messenians against some people of Ithaka. Similarly, Odysseus once saved Antinoos’ father from the wrath of the Ithakan *demos* because he had “thrown in his lot with the pirate Taphians and harried the Thesprotians, and these were friends of our people” (16. 424-30).⁶²

The concept visible, for example, in the plot of the *Iliad*, that the community has to suffer for protecting the crimes of one of its members, is here developed beyond its traditional scope: the perpetrator’s community itself takes communal action to punish him, redress the wrong he did, and thus prevent hostile action on the part of the wronged that could hurt the whole polis. Traces of such thinking are visible in the *Iliad* as well;⁶³ it plays a crucial role in Hesiod’s appeal to the *basileis* to observe the principles of *dike*, and only a small step seems required to the level of formal interstate agreements, in which the individual, whether private or official, is held as responsible for violations as the whole *demos*.⁶⁴ Not surprisingly, then, in the epics the *demos* in the sense of “people” is often described as acting collectively and sharing a common will or experience.⁶⁵

(f) Underscoring further the importance of shared communal experiences and responsibilities, much attention is devoted to the suffering caused to the entire polis by selfish and irresponsible acts of the leaders or serious conflicts among them. The *Iliad* stresses this aspect from the beginning for both the Achaians and the Trojans. Agamemnon’s grave mistakes in violating generally accepted norms of behavior first toward the priest of Apollo and then toward his most important fellow-*basileus*, just as Achilles’ unrelenting wrath and the Trojan leaders’ intransigence in refusing to fully redress the wrong committed by Paris – these are all presented, not just as excessive actions and attitudes typical of heroes but as harmful to the community. They are emphatically decried from the point of view of the people who suffer, yearn for peace, and hate this war and the perpetrator who has caused it. The efforts to bring about reconciliation between the Achaian leaders, and their eventual success

are recounted in great detail, including a careful description of how a leader can admit his mistake, make up for it, and thereby even enhance his reputation.⁶⁶ Equally, despite the *Odyssey's* focus on Odysseus' *oikos*, the suitors' perpetrations⁶⁷ are interpreted as acts which, although committed in the private realm, deeply affect the entire community. In the assembly of book 2, Mentor appeals directly to the people's sense of communal responsibility. He argues, strictly on the political level, that Odysseus was a good *basileus*; for his caring leadership the community is obliged to him and his family. In failing to protect his *oikos*, it sets a negative example: there will be no incentive for future *basileis* to provide responsible leadership (2. 230-41). This line of thought is supported, as in Hesiod, by the praise of the just *basileus* and the blessings he bestows upon his polis.⁶⁸

(g) Finally, there is the much debated question of "polis mentality". Scholars have interpreted the evidence in diametrically opposed ways, some attributing to the Homeric heroes much, some very little sense of communal solidarity or loyalty.⁶⁹ In my opinion, however, the question is not whether or not the heroes' primary concern is private – it clearly is – but to what extent they also feel public responsibility and allegiance to the polis. We are obviously dealing with a very competitive society, in which the individual's concerns are devoted first of all to his family and *oikos*. Competitive values, as Arthur Adkins has shown, often prevail over cooperative values, individual interests over those of the community.⁷⁰ But two points must be emphasized. First, although over time in the individual's range of motives that of communal allegiance gradually increased, the prevalence of individual interests and the tension between these and the loyalty demanded by the polis generally remained unchanged throughout the classical period, particularly among the elite, and caused the polis enormous difficulties, if not harm. Both the level of aristocratic integration in fifth-century Athens and Pericles' citizen ideal were possible only under exceptional circumstances; even then, I think, the latter to some extent amounted to a conscious repudiation of aristocratic values and radical "re-education" of the citizens.⁷¹

Second, the heroes' allegiance to the *oikos*, though primary, is not exclusive. Hektor says clearly that in saving the *patre* one saves one's family (15. 494-99, cited in the introduction), and, "One omen is best, to defend the *patre*" (12. 243). In the hero's competition for influence the power of his *oikos* is crucial, but service to the community is rewarded with honors and privileges, public status is tied to public responsibility, and failure in this respect threatens the leader's position.⁷² Odysseus

yearns for house, wife and son, but also for his *ge* and *patre*. This does not mean, as has been claimed, that he thinks of Ithaka as the island and country surrounding his home rather than as a polis, which thus might appear unimportant to him. Quite the contrary: *patre* and *gaia* are used in such contexts almost synonymously with *polis* not only in Homer but also in Kallinos and Tyrtaios.⁷³ All these terms describe the larger unit of belonging that encompasses the *oikos*. Thus Odysseus consistently talks of “home” as *oikos/family and country/polis*.

Cumulatively, this evidence, gleaned from traditional poetry that does not emphasize these aspects, seems to me sufficient to prove my point: the Homeric polis is indeed a community of persons or citizens and as such more than an agglomeration of autonomous *oikoi* banding together only in times of emergency. The community plays an important role in the lives and thoughts of its inhabitants. These, except for the poor and landless, all have a communal function in army and assembly. There are loose but well established communal structures: assembly and council, though not formalized, play an important and fairly regular role. There is a sense of a public realm, separated from the private, and an awareness of communal will and action, attributed collectively to the *demos*, both domestically and in dealing with other poleis. There is the capacity for communal accomplishment, both in war and peace, and there is a sense of communal responsibility and solidarity.

Confirmation for all this is found in a famous passage in the *Odyssey*, the vivid description of the society of the Cyclopes. These, although overbearing and lawless, live in a setting of golden-age abundance. But

they have neither assemblies for holding council (*agorai boulephoroi*) nor laws (*themistes*), but they inhabit the crests of the lofty mountains, in hollow caves, and each one dispenses the laws (*themisteuei*) for his children and wives, and is not concerned for the others. (9.105-15, cit. 112-15)

This society lacks all that constitutes a polis: it has no shared settlement and communal center, no shared law and no institutionalized communication, not even a shared religion (273-79) or communication by ship with other communities and the outside world (125-30). In other words, there is no community at all, only completely autonomous family units.⁷⁴ This component of the story is not part of the wide-spread folktales (a hero blinding a man-eating giant and a hero outwitting a monster by giving a false name) that are combined in the Polyphemos tale.⁷⁵ Rather, it represents a deliberate effort to conceptualize the polis by defining its

constituent components and attitudes. If the poet is able to do this negatively, by describing the ultimate “anti-polis”, he is also capable of giving a positive picture of the ideal polis. And indeed he does by setting before us the polis of the Phaiakians. They too are blessed by the gods and live in golden-age abundance, but they do everything right and fully share their communal experience; they are hospitable to foreigners and they are the ultimate sailors. As Stephen Scully concludes from these and other passages, the concept of the polis in Homer represents civilization, progress, community, justice and openness; not to live in a polis means primitiveness, isolation, fragmentation, lack of community, and lawlessness.⁷⁶

Thus all the categories we have included in our definition of the fully developed polis can be shown to exist in the Homeric polis, albeit in early and undeveloped forms. What Homer calls *polis* therefore indeed is a polis in the strict sense of the term: certainly an early forerunner of the classical polis, but much more than an “embryo”.

b. Hesiod and the Polis

Hesiod is usually dated to the late eighth and early seventh centuries (above n.11). In his *Works and Days*, he mentions his father and a quarrel about the inheritance, which “gift-devouring” nobles (*dorophagoi basileis*) had decided or might decide unfairly in favor of his brother, Perses – who, at any rate, had spent far too much time and resources on this issue and brought himself close to economic ruin instead of submitting to the farmer’s regimen of hard work.⁷⁷ These and other autobiographical details, though not lacking contradictions, are considered authentic by most scholars.⁷⁸ Thus Hesiod would be the first poet who speaks to us in his own voice and as a real person. His bitter experiences with a quarrelsome and lazy brother and with nobles who failed to uphold straight *dike* (judgment, justice), would plausibly explain his passionate devotion to *dike* and the farmer’s work ethic. But other explanations of the autobiographical elements are possible,⁷⁹ and even acceptance of the *communis opinio* does not imply that Hesiod’s poems had a narrow personal focus and were of limited regional interest. Rather, other considerations (such as the genre of didactic poetry, its Ionic origin which influenced both style and content, and the high probability that Hesiod’s poetry was no less panhellenic in function and outlook than the Homeric epics) strongly suggest that the issues raised by Hesiod were important to audiences all over Greece.⁸⁰

More generally, the *Works and Days* certainly describes the poet’s con-

temporary society. Hesiod speaks from the point of view of a farmer whose life revolves around his *oikos* and neighborhood and is dominated by the changing needs and religious concerns of the agricultural year, who is constantly threatened by debt and impoverishment but through hard labor and luck can also accrue some wealth, and who looks skeptically at the business of town and *agora* or at trade ventures overseas.⁸¹ In a broadly based anthropological analysis, Paul Millett has plausibly argued that the features emphasized by Hesiod are typical of highly competitive and individualistic peasant societies, which draw on limited resources and customarily engage in the practice of reciprocal borrowing.⁸²

What, then, does Hesiod contribute to our inquiry about the rise of the polis? While *Iliad* and *Odyssey* focus on the upper class and largely ignore the non-noble farmers, Hesiod provides their perspective, thus complementing the “Homeric” picture. Competitiveness, a constituent component of interaction among the nobles, here emerges as equally characteristic of the farmers. Hesiod explicitly distinguishes such constructive, positive *eris* from its negative, destructive counterpart (*WD* 11-26).⁸³ Thus fair and peaceful settlement of disputes, vital for the well-being of the community, is important not only on the level of the leaders (as illustrated in the Homeric epics) but also on that of the commoners. As Michael Gagarin writes,

the common man could prosper in eighth-century Boeotia only on two conditions: first of all, he must have the willingness to work hard and the practical knowledge to make his work most effective, and second, there must be peace in the society as a whole and freedom from plundering by others – that is, disputes must be settled through *dike* rather than through force (*bie, hybris*).⁸⁴

Homer illustrates the centrality of war for the leadership and value system of the upper class; so does Tyrtaios for Spartan society at large. Hesiod, by contrast, shows that under different circumstances war and warrior qualities could be perceived as less central;⁸⁵ from his perspective other values and leadership qualities are much more important, both for the individual and the polis. Thus he chooses to focus on the *basileis*, not as political leaders but as judges.⁸⁶ Of course, he is part of a polis (269, see below), but he lives in a village (*kome*, 639), a few miles from town. Having experienced the negative sides of the *basileis*’ jurisdiction, he warns of the allurements of the *agora*:

Perses,... do not let malicious Strife curb your zeal for work / so you can see and hear the

brawls of the *agora*./ Not much time for brawls and meetings (*agorai*) can be spared / by the man in whose house the season's plentiful harvest /... has not been stored. (*WD* 27-32)

The farmer, he repeats over and over, has to center his attention and efforts on his *oikos*. The only relationships essential to him are those with his neighbors (342-45). Overall, this outlook illustrates the gap that still existed between the individual and the community, and the obstacles that needed to be overcome in order to integrate one into the other.⁸⁷

This does not mean, however, that Hesiod considers the polis unimportant or ignores it. Although *polis* and *asty* are not mentioned in the *Theogony*, the praise of the good *basileus* and the hymn to Hekate presuppose gatherings of the *laoi* in the *agora* in the setting of a polis.⁸⁸ Apart from one purely traditional phrase, in the *Works and Days* the polis appears once as the victim of the destructive forces of the Iron Age⁸⁹ and four times within about fifty lines in direct connection with Hesiod's main concern, *dike*:

There is a tumult when Dike is dragged away wherever gift-devouring men lead her, judging crookedly, and she follows (where they lead) lamenting for the poleis and the ways of the people, invisible, bringing trouble to those who drive her out and have not judged straightly. (220-24)

But those who give straight verdicts and do not violate proper legal process (*dikaion*)... live in a polis that blossoms, and the people (*laoi*) prosper in it. (225-27)

But far-seeing Zeus... marks out a *dike* (punishment) for wanton wrongdoers who plot deeds of harshness. Many times one man's wickedness ruins a whole polis, if such a man breaks the law and turns his mind to recklessness... (238-41)

The eye of Zeus sees all... and knows exactly what kind of *dike* in this [i.e., our present] case the polis holds within it. (267-69)

As in Homer, here too the natural assumption is that people live in a polis. Thus the values and relationships explored and systematized by the poet, though mostly formulated in general terms, should be seen as central for society primarily in the context of the polis. Certainly, the ability to choose between *dike* and violence (*hybris*, *bie*) is shared by all humankind:

Perses... obey the voice of *dike* and always refrain from *bie*./ This is the law (*nomos*) Zeus laid down for men,/ but fish and wild beasts and winged birds / know not of *dike* and so eat one another./ *Dike*, the best thing there is, he gave to men. (*WD* 274-80)

But such capacity for *dike* can be fully realized only in the framework of a polis.

What makes the *Theogony* an important document in our present inquiry is precisely Hesiod's interest in social values. The poem, an expanded hymn to Zeus, describes, through the genealogy of gods and divine powers, the origins of the world and of Zeus' just regime. It systematizes the forces that influence human lives, including those that are essential for social and political life.⁹⁰ Among its themes the Muses announce their celebration of the "ordinances and good ways (*nomoi, ethea*) of all the immortals" (66f.) – which are thus presented as models. In particular, Zeus appears as an exemplary *basileus*. He is a powerful and resourceful leader in peace and war, capable of attracting strong followers and rewarding them generously, fulfilling all his promises and controlling power with a firm hand (402f.). His regime is based on broad consensus and on a fair distribution of privileges (*timai*: 881-85, cf. 73f.). It is characterized by the powers which serve him (Zelos, Nike, Kratos, Bie: 383-401), are associated to him by marriage (Metis, Themis, Eurynome, Demeter, Mnemosyne) or are the offspring of these marriages (such as Eunomia, Dike and Eirene, the Muses, the Graces: 886-917).⁹¹ Thus, in fact, the *Theogony* is much more than its title indicates: woven into the poem is a political program or ideal that conceptualizes the components necessary for the well-being of the polis and successful leadership in it.⁹²

Furthermore, Zeus and his daughters, the Muses, are sponsors of the human *basileis* (81-84, 93, 96), whom their gifts endow with persuasion and wisdom; thus they are able to "decide settlements with straight verdicts", for which they enjoy respect and influence in the polis (81-92). If the *basileis* make good use of such potential, they and their polis flourish; if not they suffer (*WD* 225-47): this is one of the central themes of the *Works and Days*. The myth of Prometheus and Pandora and that of the Five Ages explain the miserable state of the world and the necessity for *dike* and labor (42-212). The central section (213-85), in which most of the advice to Perses and the *basileis* is concentrated, focuses on the need (and advantages) of observing *dike*, the disasters brought upon individuals and society by the consequences of *hybris*, and Zeus' unflinching concern for these matters. Anticipating Protagoras by more than two centuries, Hesiod postulates *dike* and *aidos* (respect for others) as indispensable values of the polis:⁹³ the misery of humankind reaches its peak when Aidos leaves earth (197-201) and Dike, mistreated by gift-devouring men who "give judgment with crooked verdicts", brings evil upon them and their polis (220-24, 238-47).⁹⁴

Hesiod's exhortations are addressed in part to the *basileis*, in part to

Perses. Responsibility for finding a fair settlement in a specific dispute and for upholding the broader social norms thus rests both with the *basileus* and with the commoner (35f.). Retribution for violations will hurt both, and with them their entire community:

Perses, obey *dike* and restrain from *hybris*,/ for *hybris* is bad for the low-born man; and even the noble / find it an unwelcome burden that weighs them down /and brings them ruin.../ Many times one man's wickedness ruins a whole polis... (213-16, 240)

The last line cited is part of the “diptych” on the “just and unjust city”, which is strongly influenced by Near-Eastern concepts, particularly of divine kingship.⁹⁵ Hesiod, however, has extended the obligation to observe the principles of *dike*, on which the well-being and proper functioning of society and nature depend, from those holding power (the *basileis*) to all members of the community. Thus Hesiod conceptualizes the polis as a community of justice and fairness, in which the common good is a shared responsibility of all, high and low.⁹⁶

What, then, compelled Hesiod to emphasize these communal concerns so strongly? Part of the answer may be that it was suggested to him by some of his sources, or else that he was a thinker and early philosopher, who recognized the importance of such issues before others did. Both explanations may be correct but neither is sufficient because Hesiod decisively transformed some of the concepts conveyed to him by his sources, and similar concerns are expressed, though less insistently and systematically, in the Homeric epics as well.⁹⁷ Rather, if panhellenic poetry, whether narrative-heroic or didactic-theogonic, stressed these issues, they must have corresponded to important and wide-spread concerns of the audiences of such poetry. Thus these issues must have represented at that time serious problems, to which there were no easy solutions.

In traditional pre-literate societies, the members of the elite naturally serve as judges and repositories of knowledge concerning customary law. This obviously was true for the Homeric and Hesiodic *basileis*. It was a privilege that brought them material advantages and power, but they were also blamed and held responsible when the system failed. We do not know the cause of such failure. One important factor perhaps was increasing competition among the *basileis* and their tendency to exploit privileges and powers that traditionally were not meant to be exploited. At any rate, the problem caused conflicts, provoked criticism of the elite and appeals to enhance communal responsibility and solidarity.⁹⁸ On the

basis of such experiences, therefore, law and legal procedure were destined to play a crucial role in advancing the integration of the polis.

3. The Integration of the Polis in the Seventh and Sixth Centuries

Both the Homeric epics and Hesiod reflect an early stage of a clearly conceptualized but loosely organized polis, in which the individual, though aware of the importance of the community and his participation in it, is far from fully integrated. There is a sense of “polis mentality” but competing loyalties, particularly to *oikos* and neighborhood, are felt more strongly and immediately. When, then, do our written sources indicate a more integrated form of polis, how is such integration expressed, and what brought it about? To find answers to these questions, I shall first present two case studies, *volens volens* focusing on the two best (though still very insufficiently) documented but rather atypical poleis of Sparta and Athens, and then examine briefly the role played in this process of polis integration by aristocracy and tyranny.

a. Sparta, War and the “Great Rhetra”

Sparta is extraordinary among Greek poleis⁹⁹ but it is precisely this peculiarity, which brings out sharply the impact on the integration of the polis of one factor – extended warfare and intense pressure. This factor probably affected many poleis but none more than Sparta. Nothing, not even the often vastly overrated “Dorian migration”, compels us to assume that Dark Age Sparta differed substantially from other communities in the Greek world.¹⁰⁰ The demographic and economic factors that triggered the crystallization of the polis, social differentiation and the formation of a “proto-aristocracy” were the same here as elsewhere and, as Alkman’s and Terpander’s poetry illustrate, among other things, down to the sixth century Sparta’s upper class participated fully and successfully in the cultural developments and exchanges of archaic Greece.¹⁰¹ Indeed, the absorption of Lakonia and the subsequent conquest of Messenia were Sparta’s response to problems that plagued most of Greece at the time: increase of population and shortage of land.¹⁰² The helotization of large parts of Messenia made it possible to furnish the Spartiates with land, to consolidate their reliance on dependent labor, and thus to free them for their activities and duties as citizens.

All this, however, was not accomplished without serious difficulties. The subjection of Messenia required at least two extended periods of hard fighting and perhaps was not fully settled before c. 600. At the end of the first phase of the war, the nebulous affair of the “Partheniai” led to emigration and the foundation of Taras in 706.¹⁰³ Two generations later, a defeat by Argos and a large Messenian revolt pushed the Spartans to the brink of disaster; the hardships caused by these setbacks provoked wide-spread dissatisfaction and the demand for redistribution of land.¹⁰⁴ In reaction to such crises, the Spartiates transformed themselves into an agrarian elite of professional warriors with a peculiar educational system and lifestyle. Although social and economic differences were not eliminated, in their public function as citizens and soldiers the Spartiates were, if not fully equal, certainly largely “alike”.¹⁰⁵ The creation of the society of *homoioi* was later attributed to a legendary founder figure, Lycurgus, and retrojected into a distant past; most likely, however, it was the result of a lengthy process, which built on old institutions of men’s associations and ended only around the middle of the sixth century.¹⁰⁶

On the political level, the distinctions introduced into Spartan society by the categories of helots, *perioikoi* and Spartiates and, particularly, the privileges and obligations of the latter must have produced, at an exceptionally early time, a fairly precise concept of citizenship. If the Partheniai affair, as it seems, revolved around questions of status and property, it attests an advanced stage of this process of civic self-definition already for the end of the eighth century.¹⁰⁷ With the creation of the society of *homoioi*, the citizens increasingly focused their entire life on the public sphere. At the same time, the polis, represented by its institutions and authorities, increasingly regulated the citizens’ lives; the polis as collectivity thus assumed authority over the individual citizens: it became a political entity.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the political sphere was regulated at an early stage as well. The “Great Rhetra”, cited and explained by Plutarch (*Lyc.* 6.2-10), probably from Aristotle’s lost *Constitution of the Lakedaimonians*, is also reflected in a poetic summary by Tyrtaios (4W = 3a/b D) and thus should be dated, at the latest, around the middle of the seventh century.¹⁰⁸

After dedicating a temple to Zeus Syllanios and Athena Syllania, forming *phylai* and creating *obai*, and instituting a *gerousia* of thirty including the *archagetai*, then from season to season to hold *apellai*... so as to propose and withdraw. But to the *damos* should belong the right to respond (?) as well as power. (Plut. *Lyc.* 6.2)¹⁰⁹

The so-called “Rider” adds the following restriction: “If the *damos* should make a crooked choice, the elders (*presbygeneis*) and *archagetai* are to set it aside” (ibid. 6.8). Tyrtaios gives the following summary:

To be the first in council (*archein boules*) is for the *basileis* (who are esteemed by the gods and whose care is the lovely *polis* of Sparta) and for the aged (*presbytai*) *gerontes*; but then it is for the common people (*demotai andres*) to respond in turn with straight *rhetai*. [They are to speak what is good and do everything that is just, and not to counsel anything crooked for this *polis*, and for the mass (*plethos*) of the *demos* is to be the final decision (*nike*) and power (*kratos*)].¹¹⁰

Having set up a new cult and sanctuary to Zeus and Athena, the divine supporters of the new arrangement,¹¹¹ the community is divided into *phylai* and *obai*. Whatever the correct explanation of these terms,¹¹² what matters here is that for political and perhaps also military reasons the polis underwent an incisive reorganization, which is unthinkable without an urgent need and a strong collective will to do so. The fixed and relatively small number of *gerontes* indicates that the council was formalized and its members were selected from a larger pool of candidates.¹¹³ Although the *gerontes* continued to be chosen from among the leading families, membership was no longer an automatic prerogative of these families.¹¹⁴ The two *archagetai* (*basileis* in Tyrtaios)¹¹⁵ most likely are the successors of the leaders of the two predominant among the four village communities that coalesced in the first half of the eighth century to form the polis of Sparta.¹¹⁶ As such they would have held a position comparable to that of the paramount *basileis* in Homer.¹¹⁷ Now, about a century later, they appear as part of the formalized council. While preserving hereditary succession and other remarkable privileges,¹¹⁸ in this respect they were fully integrated into the collective leadership of the polis. In other words, Sparta had not then, and probably never had before, a “monarchy” in any precise sense of this word.¹¹⁹ The assembly too is now institutionally fixed. It is to meet regularly in connection with the festival of Apollo at a clearly designated place. The assembled *damos* has the final decision: that much is clear from both Plutarch’s commentary (despite the crux in the text) and Tyrtaios’ summary.¹²⁰ This power, however, is restricted. *Basileis* and *gerontes* have the right to make proposals, control the discussion, dissolve the assembly, and even refuse to accept the people’s opinion.¹²¹

Except for the rise to prominence of the ephorate, this system remained intact through the classical period. Such remarkable stability probably is to be explained by the militarization forced upon Spartiate society by

constant pressure: the danger of helot revolts.¹²² Thus constitutional development was frozen at an early stage; through its control over the council the Spartan elite was able to preserve decisive influence in the community,¹²³ and the permanent need for divinely supported military leadership may explain why the *basileis*, though on the “constitutional” level closely tied into the system and merely *primi inter pares* among the *gerontes*, preserved an elevated and divinely sanctioned hereditary position and considerable power in war and foreign policy.¹²⁴

The system outlined in the Rhetra is directly developed from an earlier, more informal one that must have been very similar to that described in the Homeric epics.¹²⁵ It represents, however, a decisive step beyond the “Homeric” model: council and assembly are minimally but effectively formalized, their relationship and their powers defined. A big advance is made here toward establishing in the polis a “political sphere”,¹²⁶ conceptualizing the polis as a civic community and enhancing the citizens’ participation in it. Not surprisingly, therefore, Tyrtaios, as later Solon, strongly emphasizes the “common good” (*xynon esthlon*: 9D = 12W. 15) and the quality of the polis as a shared community that supersedes the claims of the individual. In the emergency of the Second Messenian War, Tyrtaios focuses on the military side of the citizens’ responsibility; he redefines true *arete*, in marked contrast to aristocratic values (below, n.164), as the determination to fight and, if necessary, to die for the community:

No man ever proves himself a good man (*aner agathos*) in war / unless he can endure to face the blood and the slaughter, / go close against the enemy and fight with his hands./ That is *arete*, the finest prize (*aethlon*) among mortals,/ and the noblest a young man can endeavor to win./ A common good (*xynon esthlon*) this is for the polis and the whole *demos*... (9D = 12W. 10-15)¹²⁷

Both Tyrtaios and Solon wrote poems that were later entitled *Eunomia*. Among the few short fragments of the former’s¹²⁸ is the summary of the Rhetra, which thus probably was identified with the ideal of *eunomia* and presented as a solution to the crisis mentioned in the same poem (3a/bD = 4W). Solon’s later poem offers a striking analogy (below, at n.154). In Hesiod, *Eunomia* as the daughter of Zeus and Themis and sister of Dike and Eirene, represents a central aspect of Zeus’ just regime (*WD* 901f.). Alkman, another Spartan poet, no less meaningfully praises *Eunomia* as sister of Persuasion (*Peitho*) and daughter of Foresight (*Promathea*: 44D = 64P). Both Herodotus (1. 65f.) and Thucydides (1. 18) know of a Spartan tradition maintaining that an early state of civic turmoil and

disorder (*stasis, kakonomia*) had been transformed into one of *eunomia*, which gave Sparta exceptional and lasting stability. The ideal of *eunomia* thus stands not only for a good social order but for a political resolution of crisis and *stasis* and for the integration of the polis.¹²⁹

What forces or conditions made such change possible? An answer, I think, must be based on two assumptions: (a) the political reforms summarized in the Rhetra were part of, and thus cannot be separated from, the social and economic reforms that eventually produced the Spartiate society of *homoioi*; (b) such comprehensive and fundamental reforms, affecting every facet of the citizens' life, could not be realized without strong support in all groups of society. Most likely, they were the collective response to overwhelming needs and pressures both from within the community and from outside of it. We can reasonably assume that Sparta's vast conquests created an entirely new situation for all involved. The Spartiates had been engaged over an exceptionally long period of time in warfare for the community. Now they controlled a large territory with many semi-autonomous communities (*perioikoi*) and a vast number of helots. Their gain was enormous: land and economic security for all; but they also incurred an enormous obligation: constantly to defend their property and sustain pressure from below. Thus in Sparta the common well-being depended to an exceptional degree and permanently on the contribution of all citizens. The commoners proved indispensable militarily.¹³⁰ So did the "aristocracy" who provided the necessary political and military leadership. Out of such mutual dependence under constant pressure must have grown the willingness to think integratively and to subordinate the individual, whether high-born or commoner, to the common will and good. Thus it became possible to realize political integration (in the Rhetra) and, eventually, an exceptional degree of uniformity (among the *homoioi*).

b. Athens, Domestic Strife and the Enactment of Written Law

The earliest political documents surviving from archaic Athens – Dracon's homicide law and Solon's poems – were produced shortly before and after 600 BCE.¹³¹ By then Attica had long been unified, and the basic institutions were in place and at least minimally formalized. The source situation is so dismal that, despite much learned effort by generations of scholars, the history of Athens and Attica in the eighth and most of the seventh centuries, and with it the process by which the Athenian polis was formed, are irretrievably lost.¹³² It seems certain, though, that the wars, in which Athens – or some Athenians – were involved in the late

seventh and early sixth centuries did not pose a serious threat to Athens' existence or livelihood.¹³³ war thus certainly never was an integrative force in early Athenian history.

What is known about Kylon's failed attempt to establish a tyranny (c. 636)¹³⁴ shows that in Athens, as elsewhere, tyranny was the ultimate goal of aristocratic ambition in the context of aristocratic rivalries and power struggles. Moreover, it seems, popular dissatisfaction resulting from such factional strife or other causes had not reached critical levels. A few years later, probably in 621, Dracon published a set of laws concerning homicide. What else he did and why he was chosen for this office is unknown. Nor is there any certainty about the reasons that prompted such legislation. It is tempting, perhaps necessary, to connect this legislation with the Kylonian affair and its repercussions, but the chronology is far from certain.¹³⁵

Dracon's case, however, is not an isolated phenomenon. Enactment of written law seems to have been an important feature in the development of many archaic poleis: we know of several lawgivers and enough about their laws to understand their purpose and significance.¹³⁶ Some of them belonged to the "Seven Sages" who were closely connected with Delphi; they stood above the conflicts of the period and became an influential intellectual and political force.¹³⁷ Most of them were appointed in situations of serious civic crisis; the decision to take recourse to written legislation thus was a conscious response to urgent needs, whether the laws enacted were substantive or procedural.¹³⁸ In regulating by statutory law areas that were especially prone to producing conflicts, the early legislators aimed to eliminate such conflicts in the interest of communal peace. They thereby reduced the magistrates' freedom of decision and action and thus the power of the leading families from among whom these officials were chosen; they also restricted the freedom of the citizens at large and extended the power of the polis over their actions. As Gagarin concludes, the laws reflect as well

the growth of the idea of the city and citizenship... [T]he very fact of enacting a set of laws for a particular polis would enforce the idea that those who belonged to that polis were specially characterized by an obligation to obey those laws as well as by a claim on the protection offered by them.¹³⁹

Thus the beneficiary of such legislation was the entire community. Undoubtedly the increasing certainty of law and elimination of arbitrariness in jurisdiction improved the situation of the nonaristocratic citizens. But,

as Walter Eder has argued, the fact that such legislation reduced the potential for conflict and enhanced aristocratic discipline was in the interest of the upper class as well, because it lowered the risk of their collective loss of power to a tyrant.¹⁴⁰

Much of all this probably applies to Drakon's homicide law as well. Its main purpose seems to have been "the detailed elaboration of a procedure for settling disputes" in an area that was particularly sensitive and potentially harmful to the community. He emphasized consideration of intention as opposed to mere fact, made the execution of traditional self-help dependent on a court decision and instituted a jury (the *ephetai*) specifically for this purpose.¹⁴¹ As Eberhard Ruschenbusch observes, two important factors that often produce a sense of community or civic consciousness probably were not yet in place in Attica: it was neither a fully developed community of cult and religion nor a "community of fate" ("Schicksalsgemeinschaft"). There was no outside pressure; regional interests and the claims of powerful families continued to prevail. Thus the only bond that held the polis together was the central legal authority, which imposed laws and legal procedure on all citizens and strove to maintain peace in the community. Here Ruschenbusch sees the root of the Athenian "state".¹⁴² We should not overlook, however, that such legislation not only enhanced communal integration but, in fact, already presupposes the existence of developed communal structures, a formal apparatus for public debate and decision making, and thus a considerable level of communal integration.¹⁴³

In 594 Solon was elected archon; probably at the same time, in a situation of serious tension and civil strife, he was appointed arbitrator with extraordinary powers. We know the symptoms of this crisis but not its causes; modern theories abound but remain hypothetical.¹⁴⁴ Later sources, especially Aristotle and Plutarch, provide much information about Solon's actions but since few items are uncontested it is best to focus on his own statements and some of the laws that are generally agreed to be authentic.¹⁴⁵

Solon strongly blames the unjust deeds, *hybris* and rapacity of the "leaders of the people" (*hegemones tou demou*) for having brought their polis close to ruin (3D = 4W. 5-14; 4D. 1-8 = 4a/cW). Thus competition for wealth and power among the leading families – a traditional feature of aristocratic society – apparently had become excessive and oppressive.¹⁴⁶ Within this framework, two main "factions" were opposed to each other: the wealthy and powerful on one side, the *demoi* on the other (5D = 5W. 1-4; 25D = 37W. 1-5). Both sides eventually were dissatisfied with

Solon's measures; in particular, some of the "*demos*-party" had hoped that, once in power, he would distribute much of the land of the rich to the poor (23D. 13-21 = 34W; 25D. 6-9 = 37W. 7-10; see also 24D = 36W. 20-27). Thus by Solon's time the oppressive effects of aristocratic competition had alienated large parts of the population and created a "revolutionary situation".¹⁴⁷

Defending himself against his critics, Solon cites as his major accomplishment the liberation of the earth from the *horoi* (markers indicating obligations or pledges and thus an encumbrance on the land) and of the debt-bondsmen (24D = 36W. 1-15). "These things I accomplished by the power of my office (*kratos*), fitting together force (*bie*) and law (*dike*) in true harmony, and I carried out my promise" (ibid. 15-17).¹⁴⁸ In connection with his famous *seisachtheia* ("shaking off of burdens"), Solon also prohibited loans on the person of the debtor and his family, which amounted to an abolition of debt bondage.¹⁴⁹ Thereby personal freedom became an inalienable right of the Athenian citizen;¹⁵⁰ henceforth Athenian society was solidly based on a broad class of small and middle farmers. By enacting these reforms, the polis under Solon's leadership brought about deep changes in the traditional social and economic structures. The polis forged its own instruments to redress a crisis and assumed an unprecedented amount of power over its citizens.

Solon's second important accomplishment was his laws: "I wrote laws (*thesmoi*) for the lowborn (*kakos*) and noble (*agathos*) alike, fitting out straight *dike* for each person" (24D = 36W. 18-20). This legislation was comprehensive in all areas of concern to the early lawgivers, including a set of political reforms.¹⁵¹ Among these the introduction of property classes signalled the replacement of birth by wealth as criterion for political power and participation. Whatever changes Solon devised for the assembly itself, the creation of a probouleutic council, if historically authentic, must have increased the assembly's power and significance. Moreover, the citizens' communal responsibility was enhanced by the rule that anyone who wished could take action on behalf of a person who had been wronged, and by the creation of a new court of appeal (*heliaia*), which probably was identical with the assembly. All in all, the number and variety of his laws "suggest an apparently unprecedented involvement of the state and its legal apparatus in the lives of its citizens and in this respect Solon's achievement was unique."¹⁵²

Solon's policy was decidedly integrative, trying to strike a delicate balance: he recognized the need to give the *demos* a share in power and responsibility without impairing aristocratic leadership.

The demos will follow their leaders best if they are neither given too much license nor restrained too much. For satiety (*koros*) breeds *hybris* when too great prosperity comes to men lacking right judgment. (5D. 7-10 = 6W)

To the common people I have given such honor and privilege (*geras*) as is sufficient for them, granting them neither less nor more than their due (*time*). For those possessed of power and outstanding through wealth I had equal regard, taking care that they should suffer no injury... (5D. 1-6 = 5W)

Oswyn Murray characterizes it as revolutionary “that the *demos* is considered worthy of privilege at all.” Given the *demos*’ role in and contribution to the evolution of the polis, the word “revolutionary” seems too strong but is perhaps justified in view of the tendency of the elite, increasingly emphasized in contemporary poetry, to indulge in social prejudice and “attitudes of superiority.”¹⁵³

Such revolutionary ideas were based on Solon’s new understanding of the political mechanisms at work in a polis. This insight, a major advance in political thought, is formulated in the elegy entitled *Eunomia* (3D = 4W):¹⁵⁴ *hybris*, unlawful actions and abuse of power by the wealthy and powerful lead to a sequence of disasters for the polis, including *stasis* and civil war, tyranny, and the destruction of the community (14-25). Such public ill is an inevitable wound (*helkos aphykton*) that with certainty (*pantos*) hits every polis and the entire polis (*pasa polis*). This chain of cause and effect is based on empirical observation: the phenomena Solon cites are attested frequently for poleis of the seventh and sixth centuries. Thus, in contrast to Hesiod (*WD* 238-47), the process triggered by *hybris* and abuse of power is entirely socio-political. The gods invoked by Hesiod as indispensable agents of retribution are emphatically excluded by Solon: they are on our side, he says; it is the citizens (*astoi*) who destroy their polis (1-5). And where Hesiod had to rely on his belief in the justice of Zeus (*WD* 273), Solon postulates certainty (*pantos*) because the laws of politics are as predictable as those of nature (cf. 10D = 9W).

Since the community’s suffering is caused by the citizens themselves and affects the entire community, Hesiod’s recommendation to avoid polis and *agora* and focus on farm and neighborhood misses the point. On the contrary:

Thus the public ruin (*demosion kakon*) invades the house of each citizen, and the courtyard doors no longer have strength to keep it away, but it overleaps the lofty wall, and though a man runs in and tries to hide in chamber or closet, it ferrets him out. (3D = 4W. 26-29)

Solon’s ideal of *eunomia*, therefore, is inclusive and integrative: the evils

caused by *dysnomia* can only be overcome if all citizens are involved, according to status and ability, and share political responsibility for the common welfare. It is only logical that Solon is also the first ancient author and thinker who consciously addresses his audience as the speaker of the polis: our polis, we! (1f.).

My mind orders me to teach the Athenians thus: *Dysnomie* brings most evils to the *polis*, but *Eunomie* makes all things well ordered and fitted and often puts chains on the unjust; she smooths the rough, puts an end to excess, blinds insolence, withers the flowers of unrighteousness, straightens crooked judgements and softens deeds of arrogance, puts an end to works of faction and to the anger of painful strife; under her all men's actions are fitting and wise. (30-39)

c. *Aristocracy and Tyranny*

Even more than Solon's poems those of Alkaios vividly illustrate the intensity of factional strife in many archaic poleis.¹⁵⁵ Often such struggles eventually resulted in tyranny.¹⁵⁶ "Tyranny" represents the monopolization of aristocratic power by one man; thus it is also the ultimate realization of aristocratic ambition – an ambition apparently wide-spread in Solon's time. In fact, his determined refusal to use his position of extraordinary power to establish a tyranny himself, probably was rather unusual.¹⁵⁷ Tyrants used various methods to establish their power, including popular support resulting from dissatisfaction with aristocratic rule. But the tyrant's rule generally was primarily personal: the tyrant usually served the interests of only one constituency, his own (together with his family and friends). Thus his policies were directed first and foremost at securing and protecting his power. To this end he relied on all those, within and outside of his polis, who supported him, and he suppressed all those who opposed him or appeared dangerous to him.

All this does not mean, however, that in pursuing his personal goals the tyrant did not often enact measures that, intentionally or unintentionally, benefited large parts of the community or even the polis as a whole. By suppressing aristocratic rivalries and power struggles and thus securing domestic peace and stability, he generally enhanced prosperity; by killing or forcing into exile the most determined and powerful of his rivals and leaving the others no choice but to submit to his rule, he weakened the aristocracy and their power structures and loosened decisively, if not eliminated, long-standing dependencies that tied large parts of the population to the leading families. Instead, the citizens focused their loyalty on the tyrant and, through him, on the polis. This tendency was further enhanced by many of the tyrant's constructive measures

which either generally improved the social and economic conditions or (as in the case of public building, administrative improvements or innovations in cults and festivals) drew attention to the center of the polis and thus to the polis itself rather than the individual strongholds of aristocratic power. Thus undoubtedly in many cases tyranny in fact proved a positive force that decisively advanced the cohesion and integration of the polis.¹⁵⁸

The sources contemporary to these events generally represent the outlook of the aristocracy; thus they tell us little about those positive aspects of tyranny. What they do tell us is the aristocrats' fear and hatred of the tyrant¹⁵⁹ and their awareness of the harmful consequences of their infighting and abuses for their shared rule and the community as a whole.

But let him [Pittakos]... devour the *polis* as he did in company with Myrsilos, until Ares is pleased to turn us to arms; and may we forget this anger; and let us relax from the heart-eating strife and civil warring (*emphylos mache*), which one of the Olympians has aroused among us, leading the *damos* to ruin, but giving delightful glory to Pittakos. (Alk. 43D = 70 LP, Campbell; tr. Campb.)

Kyrnos, this *polis* is pregnant, and I fear that it will give birth to a man / who will be a straightener of our base *hybris*. The citizens here are still moderate, but the leaders (*hegemonēs*) / have veered so much as to fall into debasement (*kakotes*). / Men who are *agathoi*, Kyrnos, have never yet ruined any *polis*,/ but when the *kakoi* decide to behave with *hybris*,/ and when they ruin the *demos* and render judgments (*dikai*) in favor of the unjust,/ for the sake of private gain, and for the sake of power,/ do not expect that *polis* to be peaceful for long... / From these things arise discord (*staseis*), intestine killings of men,/ and tyrants (*mounarchoi*). May this *polis* never decide to adopt these things! (Theognis 39-52; tr. Nagy)¹⁶⁰

In fact, the aristocrats' role in and contribution to the early polis is ambivalent.¹⁶¹ There is no doubt that their power struggles and "international" orientation, which tended to value allegiance to their peers in other poleis more highly than that to their fellow-citizens, often proved divisive and very harmful to the community. There were good reasons that already the *Iliad* curses the person who longs for bloody civil strife (*epidēmios polemos*) by excluding him from hearth, law and phratry (9. 63f.) and thus from everything that secures protected and civilized life in the polis, that the Mytilenians chose to establish Pittakos in an "elected tyranny" (Arist. *Pol.* 1285a 35-b 1) and that the Athenian aristocrats in exile found no support among the Athenian *demos* when they tried to overthrow the Peisistratids.¹⁶² But at the same time, the polis was formed and integrated under aristocratic leadership: the formalization of offices,

council and even the assembly as well as the wide-spread efforts at written legislation were brought about by aristocrats and with aristocratic support – whatever the “pressure from below”. To a large extent, these measures must reflect attempts to regulate and channel competition and to impose self-discipline among the elite in order to reduce the amount and intensity of conflicts and to avoid the self-destruction of the whole group and community or the monopolization of power by a tyrant – which, from the aristocratic point of view, almost had the same effect.¹⁶³

In addition, much of the extant body of lyric and elegiac poetry was composed for the aristocratic symposium. These poems therefore were created and performed by aristocrats themselves, and it is from among these aristocrats that we hear not only the praise but also serious criticism of aristocratic values and behavior and efforts to promote communal values.

But if anyone were to win a victory with fleetness of foot, or fighting in the Pentathlon... at Olympia, or in wrestling...: to the citizens (*astoi*) he would be more glorious to look upon, and he would acquire a conspicuous seat of honor at competitions, and his maintenance would be provided out of the public stores by the *polis*... So too if he won a prize with his horses, he would obtain all these rewards, though not deserving of them as I am; for my craft (*sophie*) is better than the strength of men or of horses. ... It is not right to prefer physical strength to noble *sophie*. For it is not the presence of a good boxer in the community... that will give a polis more *eunomie*. Small would be the enjoyment that a polis would reap over the athletic victory of a citizen... These things do not enrich the treasure-chambers of the *polis*. (Xenophanes 2)¹⁶⁴

4. Conclusion: the Rise of the Polis

In his important essay of 1937, “When Did the Polis Rise?”, Victor Ehrenberg worked his way backward, along the extant testimonia, from Aeschylus’ *Suppliants* through reforms, inscriptions, laws and fragments of poetry surviving or at least known from the sixth into the seventh century. Several documents from around 600, he concluded, clearly attest to the existence of the polis. In Hesiod we find proclaimed for the first time that the noble is restrained by and responsible for *dike* in the face of the polis. But this *dike*, according to Ehrenberg, is not yet a traditional and admitted principle of the polis; Hesiod reflects a polis still in formation. Thus Ehrenberg dated the rise of the polis to the eighth century, beginning around 800, which in his view agreed with the con-

solidation of the state in Sparta (dated by him to well before the First Messenian War), with colonization and “the fact that the *Iliad* shows no trace of the existence of a Polis, while the *Odyssey* does.”¹⁶⁵

In his dense and stimulating book of 1986, *Individual and Community: The Rise of the Polis*, Chester Starr uses the “earliest true wars,” colonization and other changes revealed by archaeology to date the appearance of the polis to the middle of the eighth century. Although this roughly coincides with the dates he accepts for the Homeric epics, he too denies that the Homeric polis had achieved the quality of an organized state.

In the epics the Zeus-sprung *basileis* occupy the center of the stage, not only in the poetic action but as leaders in an almost static tribal system... In Homer the term *polis* denotes an agglomeration of people, sometimes fortified, or a person's homeland, but does not directly have a political significance. From the eighth century on it does have that meaning, a state marked by regular rules of procedure and a structure by which its citizens (however defined and limited) could establish and administer those rules.¹⁶⁶

In this paper, I have arrived at conclusions that differ from both Ehrenberg's and Starr's. Since we are looking, not for any kind of community in early Greece, but for the origins of one specific type which we know well in its “classical” form, it seemed preferable to work with a minimal definition of the “typical polis”, derived from that period (that is, the polis as primarily a *koinonia ton politon*, a community of citizens, of place or territory, cult, customs and laws, and largely, if not fully, able to administer itself), and to compare with this model the communities described in our earliest post-Mycenaean documents.

This comparison has yielded a clear result: both Homeric epics reflect a form of polis that is very early but certainly more developed and complete than is usually assumed. It is loosely organized, its institutions are not yet formalized, and the individual, though aware of the importance of the community and his participation in it, is far from fully integrated in it, but, and that is crucial, all essential components of the polis are in place. In fact, except for its level of integration and formalization, this polis corresponds in every respect to our working definition of the classical polis. No less important is that especially the poet of the *Odyssey* is able to conceptualize the polis: he is acutely aware of its constituent elements, its qualities and values, and he uses such knowledge creatively. From a different social, but equally panhellenic and thus at the time widely acceptable perspective, Hesiod confirms both the centrality of the polis for civilized society and a wide-spread concern for justice and communal solidarity. He too conceptualizes the values that are essential for

social and political life in the polis, but he does it more broadly and systematically, and he extends the responsibility for communal well-being to all citizens. Thus the contemporary literary sources confirm what other evidence suggests as well: changes in population and settlement patterns, the appearance of monumental temples, intensified colonization, and the beginning of organized communal warfare for the control of land – these and other changes all date to the last third of the eighth century and presuppose the existence at least of an early form of the polis.

The first phase of the “rise of the polis” – its “formation” or “crystallization” – therefore precedes the creation of the epics. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* do not illuminate this process itself but, due to their origin in oral poetry, preserve traditional social terminology and remember earlier social conditions, which partly preceded the polis and partly overlapped with it, and which can be explained with the help of archaeology and anthropology. The fact that such pre-polis conditions are still vividly remembered in the epics suggests that the process of polis formation was going on within the time-frame of “oral memory”, covering the late ninth and eighth centuries (above, at n. 14). This seems to accord well with the changes indicated by archaeology in the same period.

What were the structures from which the polis originated? A combination of Anthony Snodgrass’ archaeological and Walter Donlan’s historical-philological analyses, both solidly based on anthropological insights, may provide a plausible answer.¹⁶⁷ Snodgrass emphasizes wide-spread pastoralism as a model that helps to explain the archaeological evidence of the Dark Ages. According to Donlan’s reconstruction, based on Homeric social terminology, after the disintegration of the Late Bronze Age structures the natural social units of Dark Age Greece were small

villages and hamlets, along with their farms and close-in pastures. The word for the territory (and its people) was *damos*; the word for its main settlement was *polis*... [Each *damos*] would have consisted of a small group of families, engaged in subsistence farming and herding, who followed the lead of their ablest man. The local leader, a “big man” type, was called *basileus*... In retrospect, the subsequent evolution of community appears as a process of crystallization... In time, separate communities (*damoi/demoi*) came to regard themselves as the *demos*, a single “land-people”. One settlement (for whatever various reasons) emerged as the main population center and as the center of political, economic, and religious activity in the *demos*. Crystallization ended either at some natural boundary or by collision with another *demos*’ frontiers. This is the picture of the eighth-century community given to us in the Homeric epics.

How exactly we have to imagine this process of polis formation, what

started and propelled it, and why it happened almost simultaneously in the entire Aegean area but not everywhere, so that large parts of the Greek world preserved different structures (the *ethnos*) – all this is still very unclear.¹⁶⁸ In his contribution to this volume, Snodgrass points out that, according to demographic theory, population growth is “not a prime mover, but always an immediate result or simultaneous accompaniment, of socio-political change. What happened to population in Greece and the Aegean is, on this view, merely useful confirmation that we are right in identifying the later eighth century as a period of critical transformation.”¹⁶⁹ In looking for “distinctive new features of the polis organisation,” Snodgrass emphasizes the concepts of territoriality, land ownership and citizenship. The first two are attested in Homer, all three in Sparta at the end of the eighth century. They certainly are connected with the formation of the polis. But, I suggest, fixed and protected boundaries of the community and secure ownership of land emerge as central social concerns only when land becomes scarce. Similarly, justice and communal values become central concerns only when corresponding problems abound. Neither probably was the case at the time of the fugitive population and the “pathetically small” and scattered settlements of the Dark Ages described by Snodgrass, in which lived the big man-follower groups reconstructed by Donlan. But both concerns are attested for, or can plausibly be assumed to have existed in, historical societies of the late eighth century and in Homeric society. Like the increased social differentiation revealed by the epics and archaeology, all this requires a vastly grown and much more condensed population.

The demographic changes observed by archaeologists and the formation of the polis thus should be seen as interrelated processes, but it seems to me that population growth, if not the prime mover, certainly is *the* essential precondition: without it or before it, there simply could be no polis. The question, then, remains: How do we get from the scattered and elusive big man groups of the Dark Ages to the stratified and differentiated polis society of the late eighth and seventh centuries? Probably we have to think in terms of many small and slow changes: at the beginning, under gradually less turbulent conditions, small groups settled down, nomadism and pastoralism decreased in favor of farming, the population began to grow, social differentiation began to increase, and so on. The pace of these interrelated changes then picked up until the “multiplier effect” accelerated this process even more.¹⁷⁰ As a general picture, this is plausible enough, but the details still elude us. And why did this process produce poleis only in some areas and not in others?

Three characteristics of the emerging polis society, however, seem especially important in our present context. First, settlement patterns in the area of later poleis seem to indicate the co-existence of several small villages/big man-groups which probably tended to balance each other.¹⁷¹ There emerged local “chiefs” and perhaps regional “paramount chiefs” but these were never able to establish a strong and permanent base of power. Leadership remained relatively weak and precarious; even a strong *basileus* was no more than a *primus inter pares*. Thus, it seems, by the time of Homer and Hesiod the option of establishing a real monarchy, if it ever existed, was long gone. Accordingly, in archaic Greece there never was a “monarchy” properly speaking; “kings” did not disappear, they never existed, and thus the traditional terminology (“kings”, “kingship”, “monarchy”) should be eliminated from our books.¹⁷²

Second, as Snodgrass observes in his essay, early Iron Age society before the eighth century was not highly differentiated (although, at least in some areas, more highly than we used to think, and this assessment may change further if Lefkandi turns out to be less exceptional than it appears now¹⁷³). Despite massive and rapid changes in the eighth century, we should avoid the mistake of overestimating the degree of social differentiation in Homeric society. The elite of big men that developed into the “proto-aristocracy” of the Homeric polis and eventually into the aristocracy of archaic Greece, was not very strong. In spite of its ambition, proud self-representation and increasingly refined lifestyle, which we find reflected so impressively in the Homeric epics and the monuments of eighth-century art, economically and socially this elite of *basileis* remained relatively close to the large group of free farmers.¹⁷⁴ They never succeeded in establishing strict class barriers; as the *Odyssey* and sixth-century poetry show, social mobility was always possible and perhaps more frequent than the elite liked to admit.¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, some sort of aristocracy did emerge in the early archaic period, and it is clear that, like so much else, its development and that of the polis were inseparable and interrelated processes.

Third, while the Homeric epics and archaeology provide us with a fairly rich picture of the upper class, neither source helps us form a comparable impression of the most important group of their fellow citizens: the free farmers. Hesiod fills this gap only partly because he gives us some information about the circumstances and problems of a moderately well-off farmer but none about the general distribution of wealth and property in this class. Yet there are strong indications that a large part of these men must have played an important, even indispensable role al-

ready in the early polis.¹⁷⁶ This role, visible in the assemblies and, particularly, in the army described in the Homeric epics, forces us, I think, to reassess the socio-political impact of the hoplite phalanx. While it is entirely possible that public and private forms of warfare co-existed for a long time,¹⁷⁷ by the second half of the eighth century in communal wars mass fighting in close formations somewhat resembling the phalanx was common enough to be integrated in battle descriptions by the poet of the *Iliad*. Scholars seem to have been so preoccupied with the question of whether or not the *Iliad* reflects *the* hoplite phalanx – it does not – that they failed to pay enough attention to the phenomenon of mass fighting as such. This phenomenon indicates, I think, that the type of “heroic warfare” preceding the hoplite phalanx in modern discussions is no less a construction than the cavalry warfare preceding it in Aristotle’s scheme. Whatever the form of fighting in private raids, on the communal level, I suggest, once the polis began to crystallize, some form or other of mass combat in close formation soon prevailed, and this form gradually developed into the hoplite phalanx and tactics. Mass fighting thus evolved along with the formation of the polis and, I should add, with the concept of territoriality, and the masses of citizens providing the bulk of this pre-hoplite infantry army were an integral part of the emerging polis.

Thus the concept of a “hoplite revolution” is a modern construct as well. By adopting the hoplite phalanx, the polis did not incorporate into the army a whole new class of citizens who for the first time fought on equal terms with the hitherto predominant aristocrats and thus eventually claimed and received a share in political rights as well. Rather, the phalanx emerged, as is well-known by now, as the result, not of a sudden reform but of a long and gradual process of perfection and homogenization in equipment, formation and tactics.¹⁷⁸ Along with these changes, on the socio-political level, recruitment for the hoplite army was regulated more strictly and the rights connected with such military status were defined more clearly. The evolution of the hoplite phalanx in the strict sense of the word and the *integration* of the polis thus were interrelated processes involving the same people. Since the predecessors of the hoplites had been part of the polis’ army ever since the polis came into existence, their political integration was not – or at least not directly – a function of the hoplite phalanx but probably rather a function of the integration of the polis as a whole. As a consequence, the integration of the polis should be seen as the result of the collective will of the entire citizen body – certainly under the leadership and serving not least the

needs of the aristocracy, but also, more broadly, in a complex exchange of give and take serving the needs of the entire community.

When, then, did this second phase of the “rise of the polis” occur, when do we see indications of a more integrated polis, and what factors brought such integration about? This process certainly still is far from fully understood. Scattered testimonia such as the “Great Rhetra” in Sparta and the famous law of Dreros (650-600 BCE), both mentioning formalized institutions, as well as the emergence of written legislation all point to the middle of the seventh century.¹⁷⁹ Archaeological evidence, particularly the appearance of monumental temples, perhaps suggests an even earlier date, but too little is known about the social implications of such communal construction to allow firm conclusions. At any rate, while Tyrtaios still speaks to the citizens about the polis, Solon speaks for the polis, and in the law of Dreros as in an early sixth-century decree from Kyzikos¹⁸⁰ the polis speaks for itself: “The *polis* has thus decided!” (*had’ ewade poli*) or “the *polis* gave this” (*polis edoke*). The seventh and early sixth centuries thus appear to be the decisive period for the integration of the polis.

The factors that made such integration possible were both external and internal. Extended, if not permanent pressure exerted on the polis either from a hostile environment (as in the case of many colonies) or (as in the case of Sparta) by long wars and a large subjected population must have enhanced the unity and solidarity of the community and forced it to formalize its institutions, to adopt (written) laws and thus to eliminate as far as possible the causes of domestic discord. It probably is no accident that early testimony of such legislation and constitutional reform comes from Sparta and some western colonies. Experience in communal integration gained in the colonial world may in turn have influenced thoughts and actions in the motherland.¹⁸¹ Although the extant documentation is too poor to allow certainty, we may safely assume that neighborhood wars for the control of land and subsistence or, in extreme cases, about the very existence of rival communities had a comparable impact on many poleis during their formative stages. As Chester Starr writes, “By the classical era the boundaries of the poleis seem so firmly set that one may forget how much the wars of the eighth and seventh centuries changed the map of Greece, and in doing so required conscious organization of the body politic and military.”¹⁸² After all, already in the *Odyssey* (2.28-32, 42-44) war is singled out as the most important public issue to be discussed in an assembly. It is only in the later seventh and

sixth centuries that such neighborhood wars seem to have had less dramatic consequences,¹⁸³ and it is equally late that, for example, the Athenians did no longer fully integrate newly acquired territories (Eleutherai, Oropos, Salamis) but attached them with a different status of citizenship.

In those poleis – probably the majority – that were not affected by such pressure, integration may have been brought about by way of imitation – a factor which almost certainly was very important but is difficult to assess.¹⁸⁴ Another highly important factor, affecting an unknown number of at least the larger poleis all over the Greek world and, if not initiating at least greatly enhancing polis integration, was the plague of domestic tensions resulting from factional strife among aristocratic families and from the resistance such infighting and its consequences eventually provoked among the *demos* of free and/or dependent farmers. The reforms and laws enacted in Athens by Drakon and Solon in reaction to such crises stand as impressive examples for many others;¹⁸⁵ their significance for our understanding the processes involved is increased by Solon’s own statements, which, though unique in their political focus and penetrating analysis, are supported by a strong current of similar sentiments in the poetry of the archaic period. It is important to note, however, that laws and the development of systems of justice as integrative factors worked in two dimensions: horizontally among the elite in order to avoid destructive infighting, disintegration and tyranny, and vertically between the elite and the “middle” and lower classes in order to avoid other forms of civil unrest, civil war and again tyranny. The co-existence of such horizontal and vertical tensions, I suggest, was crucial: it was dangerous but also very productive for the polis, not the least because it forced all involved to find solutions on a communal level and to think and act politically. Hence the evolution of “the political” and of political thought in the context of this phase of polis integration.¹⁸⁶

Victor Ehrenberg emphasized correctly that the great political figures (the legislators and tyrants) did not make the polis possible or bring it into existence (although, as Walter Donlan points out, their unknown predecessors in the late ninth and early eighth centuries may have contributed much to that accomplishment),¹⁸⁷ but there is no doubt that they greatly advanced its integration and stability in the second phase of its development.¹⁸⁸

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Notes

I The question I have been asked to address in this paper is what our written sources tell us about the rise of the polis. I interpret "written sources" as literary and epigraphic evidence contemporary to the process in question, that is, of the 8th to 6th centuries BCE. For comments on the linguistic evidence, see below n. 4 and Mogens Hansen's introduction to the present volume. This paper complements that of Anthony Snodgrass which is to be compared throughout. Thus I have, with few exceptions, refrained from discussing archaeological evidence, for which see, previously, Snodgrass 1971, ch. 7, esp. 402ff., 416ff.; id. 1977, 1980, chs. 1 and 2, 1986, 1987, 1991; Coldstream 1977 and 1984; J. Bouzek, *Homerisches Griechenland im Lichte der archäologischen Quellen* (Prague 1969); V.R. d'A. Desborough, *The Last Mycenaean and their Successors* (Oxford 1964); id., *The Greek Dark Ages* (London 1972); J.M. Hurwit, *The Art and Culture of Early Greece, 1100-480 B.C.* (Ithaca, NY/London 1985); W.D.E. Coulson, *The Greek Dark Ages: A Review of the Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research* (Athens 1990); P. Blome, "Die dunklen Jahrhunderte – aufgeheilt," in Latacz (ed.) 1991. 45-60; Hiller 1991; Deger-Jalkotzy 1991 (all with rich bibliography). For a brief summary of the eighth-century evidence, including the related questions of the connection between colonization and the rise of the polis (see further P. Oliva, "Kolonisation und Entstehung der Polis," in W. Will/J. Heinrichs [eds.], *Zu Alexander dem Grossen:*

Festschrift G. Wirth II [Amsterdam 1988] 1099-1122) and of possible eastern (phoenician) influences on this process (see further n. 168), see Raaflaub 1991. 238-44. I have used (but adapted freely) the following translations: Lattimore, Fagles (*Iliad*); Lattimore, Cook (*Odyssey*); Athanassakis, West (Hesiod); Lattimore, von Fritz/Kapp, Murray (Solon). Modern scholarship, abbreviated in the footnotes, is cited in full in the bibliography at the end of this paper. Since the topic of this paper is broad and difficult, and the scholarship on every part of it immense, I have concentrated on discussion of the ancient evidence and reduced bibliographical references to a minimum, mostly citing recent publications that also serve as guides to earlier scholarship. Note also Musti et al. 1991; Welwei 1992; van Wees 1992, which I received only after this contribution was completed.

2 See, for example, R.A. Posner, "The Homeric Version of the Minimal State," *Ethics* 90 (1979/80) 27-46; W.G. Runciman, "Origins of States. The Case of Archaic Greece," *CSSH* 24 (1982) 350-77; R. Osborne, *Demos: The Discovery of Classical Attika* (Cambridge 1985) 6-10; W. Gawantka, *Die sogenannte Polis: Entstehung, Geschichte und Kritik der modernen althistorischen Grundbegriffe der griechische Staat, die griechische Staatsidee, die Polis* (Stuttgart 1985; cf. K. Kinzl's remarks, *EMC* n.s.7 [1988] 403-12, and those by K.-J. Hölkeskamp, *AAAH* 42 [1989] 197-204; D. Lotze, *AAntHung* 33 [1990-92] 237-42, among many others), Starr 1986. 43-46; Stahl 1987, part 3; Sakellariou 1989; Morris 1991, and the bibliography cited by Snodgrass 1991. 4 n.1.

3 See recently Kolb 1984. 58-61; Gawantka, *loc. cit.*; Sakellariou 1989, part 1. On the polis "as the essential Greek state" ("der griechische Staat schlechthin") in archaic and classical Greece: V. Ehrenberg, *The Greek State* (2nd ed. London 1969) xif. 26-102; id., *Der Staat der Griechen* (2nd ed. Zurich/Munich 1965) viiif. 32-125 (citations: 22 and 27, respectively); id., "Von den Grundformen griechische Staatsordnung," in *SB Akad. Heidelberg* (1961 no.3), repr. in id. 1965. 105-38. Critical discussions of Ehrenberg's views are listed by C. Meier, *Rev. of Ehrenberg, Staat, Gnomon* 41 (1969) 365-79, at 366 n.1.

4 See A. Morpurgo, *Mycenaeae Graecitatis Lexicon* (Rome 1963) 262, s.v. *po-to-ri-jo* (attested as part of men's names, perhaps containing *ptolis*); M. Ventris/J. Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* (2nd ed. Cambridge 1973), no. 39 on p. 172, line 13, with comment: "*Po-to-ri-jo* is more likely a man's name than the genitive of *ptolis*." For the etymology of *polis*, its Indo-European roots and "Achaean" background, see C.J. Ruijgh, *L'élément achéen dans la langue épique* (Assen 1957) 75-78; H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* II (Heidelberg 1970) 576f.; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots* IV. 1 (Paris 1977) 926f. See also Scully 1990. 193 n. 53.

5 See the brief comments in Raaflaub 1991. 207 n.10. For discussion, see the bibliography cited there; F. Gschnitzer, "*Basileus*. Ein terminologischer Beitrag zur Frühgeschichte des Königtums bei den Griechen," in *Festschrift L.C. Franz* (Innsbruck 1965) 99-112; C.G. Thomas, "The Roots of Homeric Kingship," *Historia* 15 (1966) 387-407; "The Dorians and the Polis," *Minos* 16 (1977) 207-18 (where the use in Mycenaean Greek of both *polis* and *asty* [*wa-tu*] and of the "same bipolarity between the central nucleus and peripheral areas" [*damoi*] as in later Greek is assumed confidently); "From Wanax to Basileus: Kingship in the Greek Dark Age," *Hispania Antiqua* 6 (1979) 187-206; G. Wathélet, "Mycénien et grec d'Homère: *anax* et *basileus* dans la tradition formulaire de l'épopée grecque," *ZAnt* 29 (1979) 25-40; G. Maddoli, "*Damos* e *basileus*: contributo allo studio delle origini della polis," *SMEA* 12 (1970) 7-57; D. Musti, "Recenti studi sulla regalità greca: Prospettive sull'origine della città," *RFIC* 116 (1988) 99-121; the contributions by D. Musti, M. Sakellariou, P. Carlier and E. Risch, in Musti et al. 1991, and the articles by S. Deger-Jalkotzy cited in n.42, esp. "Diskontinuität und Kontinuität". An extreme case is H. van Effenterre, *La cité grecque des*

origines à la défaite de Marathon (Paris 1985), whose theory justifiably has met massive opposition (reviews are listed in Raaflaub 1991. 239 n. 115). Starr 1961. 77ff.; 1986. 15f. emphasizes discontinuity. For Athens Welwei 1992 now provides detailed discussion.

6 Benveniste, *Indo-European Language and Society* (London 1973, tr. from the French ed., Paris 1969) 298. Epigraphic evidence: e.g., *IG* III. 40 = Meiggs/Lewis 1969, no. 52 = Fornara 1983, no. 103, line 60; see generally R. Koerner, "Die Bedeutung von *polis* und verwandten Begriffen nach Aussage der Inschriften," in Welskopf (ed.) 1981/85. III. 360-67, at 361f. Homer: thus M.H. Hansen in his comment on this paper: "In the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* I have not yet found one unquestionable example of *polis* meaning citadel or stronghold."

7 Cf. for example Thomas 1981. 32-35; Scully 1990. 82f., both emphasizing the marked differences between Mycenaean and archaic Greek community structures.

8 Variety of poleis: E. Ruschenbusch, "Zahl und Grösse der griechischen Staaten," in id., *Untersuchungen zu Staat und Politik in Griechenland vom 7.-4. Jh.v.Chr.* (Bamberg 1978) 3-17 (summarized in id. 1983. 305-10); id. "Die Zahl der griechischen Staaten und Arealgrösse und Bürgerzahl der 'Normalpolis'," *ZPE* 59 (1985) 253-63. For the following definition, see Ehrenberg, *State* (n.3) 88-102; *Staat* (n.3) 107-25; id., *From Solon to Socrates* (London, 2nd ed. 1973) 7; Jeffery 1976. 39; E. Meyer, *Einführung in die antike Staatskunde* (Darmstadt 1976) 68-80; M.I. Finley, "The Ancient City: From Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber and Beyond," *CSSH* 19 (1977) 305-27 = id. 1982. 3-23; Snodgrass 1980. 28; Thomas 1981. 31f.; Kolb 1984. 61-67; Osborne, *Demos* (n.2) 6-10; Gawantka, *Polis* (n.2); Sakellariou 1989, part 1; E. Lévy, "La cité grecque: Invention moderne ou réalité antique?" in C. Nicolet (ed.), *Du pouvoir dans l'antiquité: Mots et réalités* (Geneva 1990) 53-67. For additional references, see the brief discussion in Raaflaub 1991. 239-41 with nn. 115, 122.

9 Poleis without cities: e.g. Panopeis (Paus. 10.4.1) and, of course, Sparta (Thuc. 1.10.2); see Kolb 1984. 71-77 on the preconditions for urbanization and the absence of these conditions in most small poleis. Poleis with several towns: Athens is an obvious example. Poleis without territory: F. Hampl, "Poleis ohne Territorium," *Klio* 32 (1939) 1-60 = Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 403-73. Dependent poleis: e.g., the subjects of the Athenian empire and the Spartan *perioikoi*; see also F. Gschnitzer, *Abhängige Orte im griechischen Altertum*. Zetemata 17 (Munich 1958).

10 Runciman, "Doomed to Extinction: The *Polis* as an Evolutionary Dead-End," in Murray/Price (eds.) 1990. 347-67, at 348.

11 For the dates accepted by most scholars, see West 1966. 40-48; A. Lesky, "Homeros," *RE* suppl. vol. 11 (1967) 687-846, at 687-93; R. Janko, *Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns: Diachronic Development in Epic Diction* (Cambridge 1982), esp. 188-200, 228-31; J. Latacz, *Homer. Der erste Dichter des Abendlands* (Munich 1985) 77-90; G.S. Kirk on Homer and J.P. Barron/P.E. Easterling on Hesiod, in Easterling/Knox (eds.) 1985. 47-51, 93f. Among those suggesting seventh-century dates for the Homeric epics, see West 1966. 46f.; W. Burkert, "Das hunderttorige Theben und die Datierung der Ilias," *WS* 89 (1976) 5-21. Differences between the socio-political descriptions of *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, often emphasized (e.g., by Starr 1986, ch.2) and not to be ignored, should be understood in terms not only of date but also of content and focus.

12 For this and the following paragraphs, cf. the more detailed discussion and bibliographical references in Raaflaub 1991. 207-15, 248-52; in addition, B. Patzek, "Mündliche Dichtung als historisches Zeugnis: die 'Homerische Frage' in heutiger Sicht," *HZ* 250 (1990) 529-48; *Homer und Mykene: Mündliche Dichtung und Geschichtsschreibung* (Munich 1992);

van Wees 1992, ch.1; J. Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (Munich 1992), ch. 7.

13 J. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector* (Chicago 1975) 35-39.

14 I thus disagree both with Finley 1977. 47f., who dates the “Homeric society” to the 10th and 9th centuries, and with Morris 1986 and others, who fully identify it with the poet’s own.

15 I leave open the question of how and when the text of the epics was fixed in writing. Despite B. Powell, *Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet* (Cambridge 1991), I consider this question still unresolved; see, e.g., A. Parry, “Have We Homer’s *Iliad*?” *YCS* 20 (1966) 177-216; A. Dihle, *Homer-Probleme* (Opladen 1970); M. Skaife Jensen, *The Homeric Question and the Oral-Formulaic Theory* (Copenhagen 1980), ch.6; Latacz, *Homer* (n.11) 23-31, 77-90; R. Friedrich, “The Problem of an Oral Poetics,” in H.R. Runte/R. Runte (eds.), *Orality and Literature: Proc. XIth Congr. Intern. Comp. Lit. Assoc. 1985 IV* (New York 1991) 19-28; G. Nagy, “Homeric Questions,” *TAPA* 122 (1992) 17-60, esp. 31ff. If, as many believe, the epics were not fixed, in writing or otherwise, before the middle of the seventh century, we would have to expect some of what we read today to reflect “post-Homeric” Greek society of the early seventh century – which would complicate the picture even further; see, e.g., Lorimer 1950. 509-15; Burkert, “Theben” (n.11) 19f.

16 All this is carefully analyzed and amply documented in Scully 1990. The description of Troy (esp. Priamos’ family and palace [6.242-50]) most likely is influenced by reports about Near-Eastern marvels and/or fossilized memories of Mycenaean conditions; see Scully 1990; Deger-Jalkotzy 1979, who, however, overrates the difference between Trojan and Achaian features: Troy still basically is a Greek polis (see below n.28). Lorimer 1950. 442-49 suggests sixth-century interpolations in the scenes focusing on the temple of Athena (6.86-92, 269-80, 297-310); *contra*: Kirk 1985/90. II. 164-68; Scully 1990. 32-35; W. Burkert, *Greek Religion, Archaic and Classical* (Oxford 1985, tr. of the German ed., Stuttgart 1977) 96 (on the installation of the priestess by the community).

17 “Made into a walled polis” (*pepolisto*: 20. 217; cf. 7. 453); on the importance of this verb, see Scully 1990. 24f., 48 with reference to *Od.* 11. 260-65.

18 The difference between Trojan and Achaian battle exhortations is marked: 15. 494-99 vs. 502-5; 557f. vs. 561-64. There are women, of course, but they are captives, concubines.

19 Cf. Thomas 1966. 7; Murray 1983. 64. Starr 1986. 18f. mentions as a distant and partial analogy Xenophon’s army of Greek mercenaries after Cunaxa: on their march home, “they resembled a moving *polis*.” See Polyb. 6.2.2 for another example, on which cf. F. Gschnitzer, “Von der Fremdartigkeit griechischer Demokratie,” in K. Kinzl (ed.), *Demokratia: Der Weg zur Demokratie bei den Griechen. Wege der Forschung* (Darmstadt 1994).

20 See the discussion by Kirk 1985/90. II. 276-78 with bibliography. The analytical school typically attributed this fortification, like the second duel in bk.7, to a second poet (cf. P. Von der Mühll, *Kritisches Hypomnema zur Ilias* [Basel 1952] 138).

21 For the attractiveness of this topic, see the Meleagros story (9. 529-99); see further below at n.43. A parallel effort to include in a condensed time frame the highlights of the whole story can be seen in the *teichoskopia* (“viewing from the walls”) in 3. 161-246 (see Kirk 1985/90. I. 286-88) and perhaps also in Pandaros’ treacherous arrow shot, which reaffirms within the epic’s narrative the injustice of the Trojan and the justice of the Achaian cause (Raaflaub 1988. 201-3).

22 For such wars, see *Il.* 1. 152-57; 9. 529-99; 11. 655-762; 18. 509-40.

- 23 P. Vidal-Naquet, "Land and Sacrifice in the *Odyssey*: A Study of Religious and Mythical Meanings," in id. 1986. 15-38, at 18-30.
- 24 C.P. Segal, "The Phaeacians and the Symbolism of Odysseus' Return," *Arion* 1.4 (1962) 17-63; Vidal-Naquet, *loc. cit.* 26-30; Heubeck/West/Hainsworth 1988. 289-92 with bibliography.
- 25 Heubeck/West/Hainsworth 1988 at 6. 266.
- 26 The erection of freestanding temples (*neoi*) seems to me decisive for excluding vague memories of the Ionian migration (as suggested by Finley 1977. 48 and 156). 8th century: e.g., A.J. Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece* (Manchester 1963; rev. repr. Chicago 1983) 29; Morris 1986. 97f. See also *Od.* 9. 116-41 for a description of an ideal location for a colony.
- 27 Cf., for further contrast, the case of Nestor who, equally aged, still maintains full leadership and even participates in the Trojan expedition, while Peleus stays at home and sends Achilles to lead the Myrmidons against Troy.
- 28 My interpretative approach thus differs from that of Deger-Jalkotzy 1979. While she explains the sum of differences between the social and political structures of Troy and those of the Achaeans or Phaiakians with the poet's use of different models (the west-semitic city-states of the Levant for Troy, the Greek polis for the others), I do not deny Near-Eastern influences but consider most of these differences less significant and explain them at least in part as reflecting poetic selection and real differences among early Greek poleis.
- 29 For the following, see, e.g., W. Donlan, "Changes and Shifts in the Meaning of Demos in the Literature of the Archaic Period," *PdP* 25 (1970) 381-95; id. 1989. 13-16; C. Patterson, *Pericles' Citizenship Law of 451/50 B.C.* (New York 1981) 151-74; E. Lévy, "Asty et polis dans l'*Iliade*," *Ktéma* 8 (1983) 55-73; id., *Astos et politès d'Homère à Hérodote*, ibid. 10 (1985) 53-66 (cf. also the articles by M. Casevitz, M. Woronoff and others in the same vols.); M. Casevitz/E. Lévy/M. Woronoff, "Asty et polis. Essai de bilan," in *Lalies: Actes des sessions de linguistique et de littérature* (Paris 1989) 279-85; Scully 1990. 8f.; R. Koerner, "Bedeutung" (n. 6), J. Harmatta (*laos*), E.C. Welskopf (*laos, demos*), P. Musiolek (*asty*), S. Lauffer (*politès*), in Welskopf (ed.) 1981/85. III, and the index of references, ibid. I, II. I did not consult D.R. Cole, "Asty" and "Polis": "City" in Early Greece (unpublished diss. Stanford 1976).
- 30 *Contra*: Lévy, *loc. cit.* (1983). In cases such as Tyrt. 12W. 24 (cf. 15) the two terms are indeed used in very similar ways; but the similarity concerns the community in the sense of "city, town" rather than "state" ("Gemeinde" rather than "Staat"); cf. for example *Od.* 1. 3; 15. 492; 16. 63 (Odysseus has seen the *astea* of many peoples) or Archil. 64D = 133W, 88D = 172W, 109D = 170W (*astoi* as "Mitbewohner" rather than "Bürger").
- 31 Thus in Troy (*Il.* 3. 146-53; 15. 720-23) and among the Phaiakians (*Od.* 6. 53-55, 60f.; 7. 98f., 136, 189; 8. 10f., 41f., 390f.; 13. 186). In *Od.* 7. 189, *pleonas* may indicate either that not all *gerontes* = *basileis* were present in Alkinoos' house when Odysseus arrived or that *gerontes* refers to a larger group than the *basileis/ hegetores/medontes*.
- 32 These *basileis* are neither kings nor aristocrats, and the paramount *basileus* is no king either, if such words are to be used in any precise sense. Given their later connotations, such terms are mostly misleading and useless; they should be avoided altogether. For an anthropological analysis of the status and function of such *basileis*, see Finley 1977, ch. 4; Donlan 1980, ch. 1; id., "Reciprocities in Homer," *CW* 75 (1982) 137-75, at 172f. and *passim*; Qviller 1981. 109 and *passim*. See generally for *basileis* in Homer and in early Greece, apart from the bibliography cited in n. 5, Deger 1970; J.V. Andreev, "Könige und Königsherrschaft in den Epen Homers," *Klio* 61 (1979) 361-84; R. Descat, "L'idéologie homérique

du pouvoir," *REA* 81 (1979) 229-40; J. Cobet, "König, Anführer, Herr; Monarch, Tyrann," in Welskopf (ed.) 1981/85. III. 11-66, at 11-47; Drews 1983; P. Carlier, *La royauté en Grèce avant Alexandre* (Strasbourg 1984), parts 2 and 3; Starr 1986, ch.2; E. Lévy, "Lien personnel et titre royal: *Anax* et *basileus* dans l'*Iliade*," in id. (ed.), *Le Système palatial en Orient, en Grèce et à Rome* (Leiden 1987) 291-314; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989. 33ff.; Sakellariou 1989. 358-66; Ulf 1990, ch. 3. P. Barcelò, *Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis: Untersuchungen zu Entwicklung und Beurteilung von Alleinherrschaft im vorhellenistischen Griechenland* (Stuttgart 1993).

33 Scully 1981 and 1990.

34 Hence the *basileis* are called *dikaspoloi* (*Il.* 1. 258; *Od.* 11. 186). Staff: P. Easterling, "Agamemnon's *skeptron* in the *Iliad*," *PCPhS* Suppl. 16 (1989) 104-21. Cf. in general V. Ehrenberg, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum* (Leipzig 1921) 3-17, 54-62, 103-6, 128-33; Bonner/Smith 1930, ch.1; K. Latte, "Der Rechtsgedanke im archaischen Griechentum," *A & A* 2 (1946) 63-76 = id., *Kleine Schriften* (Munich 1968) 233-51; E. Wolf, *Griechisches Rechtsdenken I* (Frankfurt/M. 1950) 70-119; Gagarin 1973. 82-87; id. 1986, ch.2; Havelock 1978, chs. 7-10; Cobet, "König" (n.32) 20ff.; H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (2nd ed., Berkeley/Los Angeles 1983), chs. 1-2; A. Lesky, "Grundzüge griechischen Rechtsdenkens," *WS* n.s. 19 (1985) 5-40 and 20 (1986) 5-26. On the trial scene on Achilles' shield, see recently R. Westbrook, "The Trial Scene in the *Iliad*," *HSCP* 94 (1992) 53-76 (with earlier bibliography).

35 Although both Agamemnon (*Il.* 9. 149-56) and Menelaos (*Od.* 4. 174-77) are imagined to be overlords over several poleis, which they can give to vassals and sons-in-law, and other *basileis* rule over large numbers of poleis as well. Many interpretations of this motif have been proposed: it belongs to the oldest (Mycenaean) layers of epic tradition (Andreev, "Könige" [n.32] 365); it proves the existence of certain forms of feudalism in Homeric society (Will 1957. 45 and others [listed by Andreev, *ibid.* 365 n.15]; *contra*: M.I. Finley, "Homer and Mycenae: Property and Tenure," *Historia* 6 [1957] 133-59, at 139; Deger 1970. 89f. [with n. 379], 111); it certainly is not "a reflection of political reality, either in the Mycenaean age or subsequently" (Heubeck/West/Hainsworth 1988. 204f. [at *Od.* 4. 174-77]); it is a poetic fiction supporting the concept of a Mycenaean overlordship (G. Jachmann, *Der homerische Schiffskatalog und die Ilias* [Cologne 1958] 98-105); it presupposes the experience of the First Messenian War (E. Schwartz, "Tyrtaios," *Hermes* 34 [1899] 428-68, at 445, and others [listed by Burkert, "Theben" (n.11) 19 n.44]; *contra*: U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Die Ilias und Homer* [Berlin 1916] 66).

36 For the following discussion, see generally Hoffmann 1956; Starr 1957; id. 1986; Thomas 1966; Deger 1970; Finley 1977, ch. 4; Spahn 1977, ch.1; Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1977. 49-53; Luce 1978; C. Mossé, "Ithaque ou la naissance de la cité," *Ann. del sem. di studi del mondo class., sez. archeol. e storia ant.* 2 (Naples 1980) 7-19; Donlan 1980, ch.1; id. 1989; Gschnitzer 1981, ch. 2; "Zur homerischen Staats- und Gesellschaftsordnung," in Latacz 1991. 182-204; K.W. Welwei, "Adel und Demos in der frühen Polis," *Gymnasium* 88 (1981) 1-23; Qviller 1981; Murray 1983, ch. 4; J. Halverson, "Social Order in the 'Odyssey'," *Hermes* 113 (1985) 129-45; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989, ch. 1; Sakellariou 1989. 349-92 (with a survey of scholarship, 349-55), and the contributions in Musti et al. (eds.) 1991. More literature is cited in Raaflaub 1991. 239-47.

37 See the brief discussion in Raaflaub 1991. 223-25.

38 Cf. Finley 1977. 155f.; Drerup 1969. 131, 133. Finley's conclusions are refuted by Morris 1986. 100-4. See also Snodgrass 1971. 435.

39 See Snodgrass' contribution to the present volume, and F. de Polignac's study of the

emergence of rural cults in the eighth century and their significance for territorial demarcation (*La naissance de la cité grecque* [Paris 1984]; cf. Snodgrass 1991. 18).

40 The historicity of this catalogue and the period to which it refers are much debated; see recently A. Giovannini, *Etude historique sur les origines du catalogue des vaisseaux* (Berne 1969: eighth or seventh centuries); R. Hope Simpson/J.F. Lazenby, *The Catalogue of Ships in Homer's Iliad* (Oxford 1970: 13th cent.), and the useful summary by Kirk 1985/90.I. 166ff. (with bibliography and commentary), who emphasizes that towns provide the vast majority of place names (173). See also Sakellariou 1989. 378-92, and the contribution by D. Marcozzi/M. Sinatra in Musti et al. 1991. 145-54.

41 See in general Coldstream 1977. 317-27; id. 1984. 9-11; id., "Greek Temples: Why and Where?" in: P. Easterling/J.V. Muir (eds.), *Greek Religion and Society* (Cambridge 1985) 67-97, at 68-72; Snodgrass 1977. 24-26, 29f.; id. 1980. 33, 55-60; id. 1986a (on communication, competition and imitation among early Greek poleis); id. 1991. 17f.; Starr 1986. 39f. As Snodgrass emphasizes (see also his contribution to the present volume), temple construction was only one aspect of a whole complex of relatively sudden changes in the religious sphere, some of which affected all citizens, indicating that the whole community changed its ways. The emergence, in the same period, of rural sanctuaries (see n.39) and of the great panhellenic sanctuaries needs to be mentioned here as well. On the latter, see recently C. Rolley, "Les grands sanctuaires panhelléniques," in R. Hägg (ed.), *The Greek Renaissance of the Eighth Century B.C.: Tradition and Innovation* (Stockholm 1983) 109-14; C. Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles: The Transformation of Olympia and Delphi in the Eighth Century BC* (Cambridge 1990).

42 In his comments on my interpretation of "Homeric society," M.H. Hansen raised the following objection, among others: To "find both a palace and a temple in Troy is very strange... The temple is indeed an integral part of the Greek polis... Palaces on the other hand are unattested in Greek architecture between the bronze age and the late classical period... The palace of Priam is probably one of the bronze age anachronisms, and to have a palace and a temple within the same walls is a chimera." The same combination, however, exists in Homeric Scheria. The description of Priamos' palace certainly owes much to ancient memories or Near-Eastern lore (above n.16) and that of Alkinoos befits the leader of a fantastically blessed *Märchenwolk*. "Palace," however, is a modern term. The epics call these structures "houses": *domos*, *doma* in sg. and pl. (*Il.* 6. 242; *Od.* 6.13, 299, 302; 7.46 etc.). These words are used as well for the "palaces" of Menelaos (*Od.* 4.2), Nestor (3.387) and especially that of Odysseus, obviously a large farmhouse (1.116, 126 and often; see generally H. Strasburger, "Der soziologische Aspekt der homerischen Epen," *Gymnasium* 60 [1953] 97-114 = id., *Studien zur Alten Geschichte* I [Hildesheim/New York 1982] 491-518). Lorimer 1950. 406-33; A.J.B. Wace, "Houses and Palaces," in Lorimer/F.H. Stubbings (eds.), *A Companion to Homer* (New York 1962) 489-97; B.C. Rider, *Ancient Greek Houses* (Chicago 1964) 166-209, and many others (listed by Drerup 1969. 129 n.157) have sought the model for these "palaces" in Mycenaean palace architecture. More recently, Drerup 1969. 128-33 (with bibl.) and others have demonstrated that in this case too the model more likely is to be found in the Geometric period, in the architecture of the leader's large house with *Herdsaal* and many other corresponding details, even frequent and artful use of bronze. See also Snodgrass 1971. 423-29, 435; Coldstream 1977. 304-10; K. Fagerström, *Greek Iron Age Architecture*. Studies in Mediterranean Archaeology 81 (Göteborg 1988), and the lit. cited by Hiller 1991. 81-83. See now also A. Veneri, "Omero e il palazzo miceneo: alcuni aspetti della evoluzione semantica di termini architettonici nel contesto della tradizione linguistico-stilistica dell'epos," in Musti et al. 1991. 177-86. For the prehistory and cultural signifi-

cance of such “chiefs’ houses” in the post-Mycenaean period and Dark Ages, see S. Deger-Jalkotzy, “Frühgriechische Herrschaftsformen in mykenischer Zeit,” *Jahrbuch der Universität Salzburg 1985-1987* (Salzburg 1989) 133-51, at 143-47; “Diskontinuität und Kontinuität. Aspekte politischer und sozialer Organisation in mykenischer Zeit und in der Welt der Homerischen Epen,” in Musti et al. 1991. 53-66; 1991. 147f.; Blome (n.1) 48-52, 58.

43 Traditions: Scully 1990. 24-31, 41-53, 82-86, 95-98, 141-57. Rareness of city fortifications: see F.E. Winter, *Greek Fortifications* (Toronto 1971), who concludes: “On the whole, between the mid-eighth and the mid-seventh century Greek fortifications advanced some distance beyond the level of the Geometric period. This progress was not confined to the newer colonial settlements; it is also found in the older centres, especially in Asia Minor” (292); cf. H. Lauter-Bufé/H. Lauter, “Die vorthemistokleische Stadtmauer Athens nach philologischen und archäologischen Quellen,” *AA* (1975) 1-9, at 1f. Most of the oldest known city-walls, however, seem to date to the early 7th century (e.g., Eretria, Corinth [Lauter/Lauter, *ibid.*], Leontinoi, Iasos [Winter 103, 128]). There are a few Geometric fortifications, but they hardly qualify as “city walls” and in several cases there is no continuity to the subsequent polis period (see Snodgrass 1986b. 126, 128f.). Only Old Smyrna (Drerup 1969. 44-46 with earlier bibliography), if the traditional date is upheld by the reinvestigation currently under way (Snodgrass 1991. 9), seems to be older. See generally A. Wokalek, *Griechische Stadtbefestigungen: Studien zur Geschichte der frühgriechischen Befestigungsanlagen* (Bonn 1973), and the bibliography cited in the following notes.

44 Wooden structures: *Il.* 12. 54-7, 258-60; *Od.* 7. 44f.; Heubeck/West/Hainsworth 1988. 323 at 7. 45 with literature. (In the discussion of his 1986b article [418], however, Snodgrass thinks of “imaginary fortifications”, perhaps based on memories of Bronze Age constructions.) Walls in colonial cities: Winter, *loc. cit.* 290-92; Snodgrass 1991. 9f.; *id.* 1986b. 129, and the contributions by A. Wasowicz, M. Coja, D. Adamesteanu, V.P. Tolstikov and H. Tréziny, in P. Leriche/H. Tréziny (eds.), *La fortification dans l’histoire du monde grec* (Paris 1986), who all emphasize the lack of systematic exploration, the gaps in our evidence and knowledge, and the uncertainties in dating some of the early remains – which all hamper a reliable assessment of this issue. Shield of Achilles: K. Fittschen, *Bildkunst I: Der Schild des Achilleus*. Archaeol. Homeric II vol. N1 (Göttingen 1973), esp. 10-17 with bibl., 25-27; M. Edwards, *The Iliad: A Commentary V* (Cambridge 1991) 200ff. (200: “the shield displays... scenes familiar to the poet’s audience from their everyday life”; cf. 208f., 34-37). To the supporters of a seventh-century date of the epics the archaeological evidence, of course, poses fewer difficulties.

45 Snodgrass 1991. 9. No criterion: Wokalek, *Stadtbefestigungen* (n. 43) 27f.; Snodgrass 1991. 7-10 (cf. *id.* 1977. 21-24; 1980. 32; 1986b. 130); W. Eder, “Epilog,” in K. Raaflaub/E. Müller-Luckner (eds.), *Anfänge politischen Denkens in der Antike: Die nahöstlichen Kulturen und die Griechen* (Munich 1993) 427-49, at 434, with reference to F. Lang, *Archaische Siedlungen in Griechenland* (Diss. Berlin, forthcoming).

46 See esp. Connor 1988 and below under (c).

47 Snodgrass 1991. 10 emphasizes local conditions but dismisses fortifications of the citadel; cf. *id.* 1986b. 126, 130: repairs but no new fortifications are documented so far. I do not find Snodgrass’ tentative explanation plausible: “This was perhaps because oligarchies continued to dominate many Archaic cities and because, as Aristotle says, ‘a citadel is suitable to oligarchies and monarchies’” (1986b. 130).

48 I consider it significant that later authors, such as Polybius, certainly an expert (18. 29. 6, referring to *Il.* 13. 131-33), and Diodorus (16. 3. 2) had no difficulty in recognizing the phalanx in Homer’s battle descriptions: Pritchett 1985. 24 n.78.

49 See esp. 4. 446-56; 8. 60-63; 11. 67-73; 12. 77f., 86f., 105f.; 13. 125-35; 16. 210-17, 563-69, 632-44; 17. 356-65; Nestor's warning, 4. 303-5; the contempt for archers, 11. 385-90; the battle cry of 9-10,000 men, 14. 147-49. J. Latacz, *Kampfparänese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit in der Ilias, bei Kallinos und Tyrtaios* (Munich 1977); Pritchett 1985, esp. 7-33; P. Krentz, "The Nature of Hoplite Battle," *CA* 4 (1985) 50-61, are especially useful. See further, on warfare in Homer, Lorimer 1950, ch. 5; G.S. Kirk, "War and the Warrior in the Homeric Poems," in Vernant (ed.) 1968. 93-118; P.A.L. Greenhalgh, *Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages* (Cambridge 1973); H. van Wees, "Leaders of Men? Military Organisation in the *Iliad*," *CQ* n.s. 36 (1986) 285-303; id., "Kings in Combat: Battles and Heroes in the *Iliad*," *CQ* n.s. 38 (1988) 1-24; id. 1992; Ulf 1990, ch. 4.2, and the literature cited in n. 178.

50 For another model possibly underlying the poet's description of the Trojan War, see Raaflaub 1991. 223.

51 See Snodgrass 1980. 37-40 on the connection between the political phenomenon of the advent of the polis and the economic one of the increasing importance of land ownership; see also below at n.169.

52 See the brief discussion in Raaflaub 1991. 225-30, and Detienne 1968. 132f., 141; Meier 1980. 66f. = id. 1990. 37f.; Snodgrass 1986. 15f.; Morris 1987. 196-201. See also n. 178 below and the bibliography cited there.

53 Starr 1977, ch. 6; id. 1986. 30-33; Murray 1983. 68.

54 For discussion of assembly and council in Homer, see, e.g., Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 333-41; R. Martin, *Recherches sur l'agora grecque* (Paris 1951) 17-41; Vernant 1962, chs. 3 and 4; M. Detienne, "En Grèce archaïque: géométrie, politique et société," *Annales ESC* 20 (1965) 425-41; Finley 1977. 78ff., 108ff.; Spahn 1977. 29ff., esp. 34ff.; J.V. Andreev, "Die politischen Funktionen der Volksversammlung im homerischen Zeitalter," *Klio* 61 (1979) 385-405; id., "Volk und Adel bei Homer," *Klio* 57 (1975) 281-91; W. Donlan, "The Structure of Authority in the *Iliad*," *Arethusa* 12 (1979) 51-70; F. Gschnitzer, "Der Rat in der Volksversammlung. Ein Beitrag des homerischen Epos zur griechischen Verfassungsgeschichte," in P. Händel/W. Meid (eds.), *Festschrift R. Muth* (Innsbruck 1983) 151-63; Starr 1986. 18-21, 25f.; J.F. McGlew, "Royal Power and the Achaean Assembly at *Iliad* 2.84-393," *CA* 8 (1989) 283-95; Sakellariou 1989. 366-71. See now also P. Carlier, "La procédure de décision politique, du monde mycénien à l'époque archaïque," in Musti et al. 1991. 85-95. E. Ruschenbusch, "Zur Verfassungsgeschichte Griechenlands," in Kinzl (ed.), *Demokratia* (n. 19) offers good observations but claims, based on a far too unspecific definition of "democracy", that Homeric assemblies are democratic.

55 The assemblies in *Il.* 2 and 9.9-79, *Od.* 2 and 8. 4-45 are especially important. In *Od.* 8. 16 as in *Il.* 2. 99 the crowds quickly fill the *hedrai* in the *agora*: wooden benches or permanent seats? See also *Od.* 3. 136-50 for attention to proper procedure. The "twenty-year hiatus" in Ithakan assemblies (*Od.* 2. 26f.) has often been vastly overrated. In the poet's real world, it probably was normal to suspend assembly meetings during absences of the leader and his men: even if such absences (for example, for a raiding expedition) lasted longer than a few days or weeks, this would have caused no problem. In this case, however, this normal experience seems to have been grafted upon an old tradition of a war that in every respect (manpower, distance, time) had assumed truly heroic dimensions (thus ten years, just as in the case of Odysseus' *nostos* or the siege of Veii in Rome's heroic past: I cannot understand why such a figure should be taken literally). If so, the twenty-year hiatus represents a poetically distorted rather than an authentic piece of evidence and cannot be used for any historical conclusions on the political significance of the assembly in the Homeric polis.

- 56 See G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) 35-39 with bibl.
- 57 The prime example, of course, is Agamemnon in the *Iliad*, books 1, 2, 9 and 19; see also n.60.
- 58 Detienne, "En Grèce archaïque" (n.54) 429-41; Havelock 1978, ch. 7. Thus it is fitting that it is Themis who is the sponsor of assemblies (*Od.* 2. 68f., cf. Hekate in Hesiod, *WD* 430f.).
- 59 *Od.* 15. 466-68 with Heubeck/Hoekstra 1989. 260f.; cf. 6. 53-55, 60f. We are reminded of Alkaios' complaint, 130B LP, Campbell.
- 60 E.g., 2. 53-83; 7. 323-44; 9. 89-173 (with 9-79); 14. 27-134. Cf. also, for the Trojan side (Hektor and Poulydamas), *Il.* 12. 210-50; 13. 723-48; 18. 243-313 with 22. 99-110. On competition among equals and the decisive role of speech and persuasion: Vernant 1962. 40-45.
- 61 Accordingly, in the epics Zeus is not called *basileus* but *pater* (father in a patriarchal family; cf. the Roman *paterfamilias*) and *anax* (master of a hierarchically structured *oikos*): see H. Erbse, *Untersuchungen zur Funktion der Götter im homerischen Epos* (Berlin/New York 1986) 209-18.
- 62 Nestor's story in *Il.* 11. 669-761 contains similar elements.
- 63 Thus in Achaian and Trojan reactions to Pandaros' violation (4. 73-140) of the treaty of 3. 67-120 (4. 157-68; 7. 345-80, 390, 393, 400-2), although no one considers punishment of Pandaros. B.G. Wickert-Micknat, *Unfreiheit im Zeitalter der homerischen Epen* (Wiesbaden 1983) 18-21, 90-92 suggests that curse prayers such as *Il.* 3. 297-300 (cf. 4. 155-68, 234-39) might reflect early efforts to secure peace by oath and treaty.
- 64 See, e.g., Meiggs/Lewis 1969, no. 17 (a sixth-century treaty between Eleans and Heraians), on which cf. Ehrenberg 1937. 151 = 1965. 88: "we could not desire a plainer statement that the whole stands for the one, the one for the whole." For a slightly later period: Heuss 1946. 49-53 = Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 74-80.
- 65 The evidence is collected in Donlan 1989. 14.
- 66 Havelock 1978, ch. 7. See generally F. Gschnitzer, "Politische Leidenschaft im homerischen Epos," in H. Görgemanns/E.A. Schmidt (eds.), *Studien zum antiken Epos* (Meisenheim am Glan 1976) 1-21; Raaflaub 1988. 201-15; id., "Homer and the Beginning of Political Thought in Greece," in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 4 (1988) 1-25; "Die Anfänge des politischen Denkens bei den Griechen," *HZ* 248 (1989) 1-32, and the bibliography cited in id. 1991. 248 n. 141; in addition, see now W. Nicolai, "Gefolgschaftsverweigerung als politisches Druckmittel in der Ilias," in Raaflaub/Müller-Luckner, *Anfänge* (n.45) 317-41.
- 67 For a brief discussion of the manifold problems, see Heubeck/West/Hainsworth 1988. 56-60.
- 68 *Il.* 16. 384-92; *Od.* 19. 106-14; cf. Raaflaub 1988. 208-14; id. "Beginning" (n.66) 11-15; *contra*: P. Spahn, "Individualisierung und politisches Bewusstsein im archaischen Griechenland," in Raaflaub/Müller-Luckner, *Anfänge* (n.45) 343-63. Communal responsibility is also expressed in, and a certain level of communal integration presupposed by, the obligation, enforced by Zeus himself, to care for the poor, suppliants and other outsiders (see Havelock 1978, ch.9).
- 69 See the bibliography cited in n.36; in addition, H. Strasburger, "Der Einzelne und die Gemeinschaft im Denken der Griechen," *HZ* 177, 227-48 = id., *Studien I* (n.42) 423-48 = Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 97-122; P.A.L. Greenhalgh, "Patriotism in the Homeric World," *Historia* 21 (1972) 528-37; Spahn (n.68).
- 70 A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values* (Oxford 1960; repr.

Chicago 1985), chs. 2 and 3; id., *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece* (London/New York 1972), ch. 2; see also G. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (Cambridge 1987); Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989, ch.1.

71 See the works cited in n.70 and my essay on "Democracy and Power in Fifth-Century Athens," forthcoming in J.P. Euben/J. Ober/J. Wallach (eds.), *Educating Democracy: The Contemporary Significance of Athenian Political Thought* (Ithaca NY 1994).

72 For a brief discussion, see Donlan 1980, ch.1; Nicolai (n.66).

73 Kallinos 1D = 1W. 7, 16-19; Tyrnt. 9D = 12W. 15, 24, 28, 34, 39. On Kallinos, see R. Leimbach, "Kallinos und die Polis," *Hermes* 106 (1978) 265-79.

74 I deliberately focus here on the social and political aspects. There is much more to the story: see for example Vidal-Naquet, "Land and Sacrifice" (n.23) 21f.; R. Friedrich, "Heroic Man and *Polymetis*: Odysseus in the *Cyclopeia*," *GRBS* 28 (1987) 121-33.

75 See Heubeck/Hoekstra 1989. 19f.

76 Scully 1981. 5ff.; id. 1990; see also Redfield, *Nature* (n.13).

77 Father: 633-40; brother: 27-41 and often. See M. Gagarin, "Hesiod's Dispute with Perses," *TAPA* 104 (1974) 103-11; Erler 1987. 7-9, both with (different) earlier bibliography. On *dorophagos*, see R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes* (Leipzig 1907) 419-21; Gagarin, *loc. cit.* 105 with n.5, 109f. with n. 19; West 1978. 151; Erler 1987. 8 with nn. 14 and 17.

78 Gagarin, *loc. cit.*; West 1978. 33-40; Millett 1984. 85f. with bibliography.

79 See, for example, P. Walcot, "Hesiod and the Law," *SO* 38 (1963) 5-21; F. Krafft, *Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Homer und Hesiod* (Göttingen 1963) 86-92; M. Griffith, "Personality in Hesiod," *CA* 2 (1983) 37-65, and esp. Nagy 1982. 49-66.

80 Didactic poetry: West 1978. 3-30; Martin 1984; doubts in M. Heath, "Hesiod's Didactic Poetry," *CQ* n.s. 35 (1985) 245-63. H. Diller, "Die dichterische Form von Hesiods Erga," *Abh. Akad. Mainz, geistes- und sozialwiss. Kl.* 1962, no.2, 41-69 = E. Heitsch (ed.), *Hesiod. Wege der Forschung* 44 (Darmstadt 1966) 239-74, argues for parenetic poetry with close connections to some Homeric speeches. Ionic models in form and content: M.L. West, "La formazione culturale della *polis* e la poesia esiodea," in R. Bianchi Bandinelli (ed.), *Storia e civiltà dei Greci I* (Milan 1979) 254-90, at 258. Panhellenic poetry: Nagy 1982. 43-49 and *passim*.

81 For summaries, see A.R. Burn, *The World of Hesiod* (London 1936), ch. 2; M. Detienne, *Crise agraire et attitude religieuse chez Hésiode* (Brussels 1963); Spahn 1977. 51-58; 1980. 533-44; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989. 57-63.

82 Millett 1984. 92-107, with discussion of earlier interpretations of the economic situation reflected in Hesiod. See esp. Ed. Will 1957; Detienne, *Crise* (n.81) 21-27; *contra*: E. Will, "Hésiode: crise agraire ou recul de l'aristocratie?" *REG* 78, 542-56; Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1977. 58-60; Spahn 1980. 537.

83 See West 1978. 142f. and recently M. Gagarin, "The Ambiguity of *Eris* in the *Works and Days*," in M. Griffith/D.J. Mastronarde (eds.), *Cabinet of the Muses: Essays... in Honor of T.G. Rosenmeyer* (Atlanta 1990) 173-83.

84 Gagarin 1973. 88; cf. 92, 94.

85 See H.T. Wade-Gery, "Hesiod," *Phoenix* 3 (1949) 81-93 (= id., *Essays in Greek History* [Oxford 1958] 1-16), at 91f.

86 In *Theog.* 81-93 this function is described very positively, in the *Works and Days* much more critically. West 1966. 44 explains this with the poet's addressing different audiences. This is possible but unlikely, given the panhellenic nature of such poetry. Rather, the *Theogony* generally provides a positive example of leadership (Zeus' just rule among the

gods: see below), while the *Works and Days* criticizes a negative example (the arbitrariness of human *basileis*): see Raaflaub 1988. 216-24.

87 Thus also Spahn 1980. 544.

88 *Theog.* 80-93 (reminiscent of *Il.* 18. 497-508 and *Od.* 8. 166-77; on the latter, see Martin 1984 with bibl.), 430-34.

89 527 (*demon te polin te*); 189 ("and they will sack one another's poleis"), on which see West 1978. 201.

90 I do not mean to imply that these political aspects dominate the poem, but they are an important part of it and obviously emphasized with great care.

91 The social and political significance of all these powers is obvious; that of the Muses is emphasized in *Theog.* 81-93 (below; cf. West 1966 *ad loc.*; D. Boedeker, *Descent from Heaven: Images of Dew in Greek Poetry and Religion*. Am Class. St. 13 [Chico, CA 1984] 84-88); on that of the Graces, see C. Meier, *Politik und Anmut* (Berlin 1985) 31ff. and *passim*.

92 For a more detailed analysis with references, see F. Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (Ithaca, NY 1949) 3-75; N.O. Brown, *Hesiod, Theogony* (Indianapolis 1953) 7-50; Raaflaub 1988. 216-20; see also Jaeger 1965. 57-76; Havelock 1978, ch.11.

93 Plato, *Prot.* 322C ff.; for *aidos*, see Martin 1984. 38-45 with earlier literature.

94 On all this see recently H. Erbse, "Die Funktion des Rechtsgedankens in Hesiods 'Erga'," *Hermes* 121 (1993) 12-28. Gagarin 1973. 81, cf. 91f.; 1986. 46-50, emphasizes the limited semantic scope of *dike*. In the *WD*, it "may mean 'law' in the sense of a process for the peaceful settlement of disputes," but it "does not apply to actions outside this narrow area of law and does not have any general moral sense." Even on the semantic level, this probably is too narrow (cf., e.g., Wolf, *Rechtsdenken* [n.34] 120-51; Erler 1987), but Gagarin also seems to overlook that *dike* does not cover the whole range of the *concept* of justice: although *dike* is of special importance, Hesiod's concern for, and Zeus' protection of, social and moral norms extend far beyond the specific realm of *dike*: see, e.g., 42-106 (esp. 47-49, 56-59, 91-93, 106), 174-201, 286-92, 320-35.

95 See P. Walcot, *Hesiod and the Near East* (Cardiff 1966), esp. 72f.; West 1978. 213; Erler 1987. 14-21 with literature, who also discusses analogies and differences in *Il.* 16. 384-92; *Od.* 19.106-14. Cf. also Vidal-Naquet 1986. 16.

96 Thus also Erler 1987. 12-21; cf. B. Snell, *Dichtung und Gesellschaft* (Hamburg 1965) 61. *Contra*: Starr 1986. 25: "In both the *Odyssey* and in Hesiod's works, the responsibility for justice is in the hands of Zeus, watching over the *basileus*; there is not yet any idea that men by their own actions can secure or restore justice to a community." My own analysis leads to a different conclusion: "Anfänge" (n.66), esp. 27f.; "Beginning" (n.66), esp. 18f.

97 See the passages cited in n.88 and 95. For justice in Homer, see above n. 34.

98 Competition and exploitation: Starr 1961. 313ff.; 1977. 46-54; Spahn 1977. 54f., 121ff., and see above at n.70. Criticism of the elite: W.G. Forrest, *CAH* III.3 (2nd ed. 1982) 288, and the literature cited in n.66.

99 See the discussions by Finley 1968; J.V. Andreev, "Sparta als Typ einer Polis," *Klio* 57 (1975) 73-82; P. Cartledge, "The Peculiar Position of Sparta in the Development of the Greek City-State," *PRIA* 80 (1980) 91-108; also K. Bringmann, "Die soziale und politische Verfassung Spartas – ein Sonderfall der griechischen Verfassungsgeschichte?" *Gymnasium* 87 (1980) 465-84 = Christ (ed.) 1986. 448-69; S. Hodkinson, "Social Order and the Conflict of Values in Classical Sparta," *Chiron* 13 (1983) 239-81. Most aspects of early Spartan history present hotly debated and probably insoluble problems (C.G. Starr, "The Credibility of Early Spartan History," *Historia* 10 [1961] 257-72 = id. 1979. 144-59; cf. M. Clauss,

Sparta. Eine Einführung in seine Geschichte und Zivilisation [Munich 1983] 14-23). In the following section I take a middle position that is accepted by most scholars (C. Mossé, "Sparte archaïque," *PdP* 28 [1983] 7-20, provides a model). For detailed discussions see Michell 1964; Oliva 1971; Cartledge 1979, and the literature cited there; brief discussions in Sealey 1976. 66-88; Jeffery 1976. 111-32; Welwei 1983. 95-139; Murray 1983. 153-72. K. Christ, "Spartaforschung und Spartabild. Eine Einleitung," in id. (ed.) 1986. 1-72, offers a *Forschungsgeschichte* and *ibid.* 471-503 a good bibliography.

100 For discussion of the situation in the tenth and ninth centuries, see Cartledge 1979. 75-101; for a brief sketch, Welwei 1979. 187-92. See also Roussel 1976. 236 and, more generally, Deger-Jalkotzy 1991.

101 Kiechle 1963. 133-41; id., "Eunomia und Oligarchie," in *XIII Congr. Intern. des Sciences Historiques* I (Vienna 1965) 279-90; cf. briefly Murray 1983. 165f. On Alkman and Terpanther, see, e.g., C.M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry from Alcman to Simonides* (Oxford 1961), ch.2; A.J. Podlecki, *The Early Greek Lyric Poets and their Times* (Vancouver 1984), ch. 4; C.P. Segal in Easterling/Knox 1985. 168-85.

102 Lakonia: Kiechle 1963, chs. 2 and 3; Cartledge 1979, ch. 8. Messenia: F. Kiechle, *Messenische Studien* (Kallmünz 1959); Oliva 1971. 102-14; Cartledge 1979. 113-27.

103 P. Wuilleumier *Tarente des origines à la conquête romaine* (Paris 1939) 29-47, esp. 39-42; Kiechle 1963. 176-83; Cartledge 1979. 123-25. For emigration and colonization from Sparta, see also I. Malkin, *Myth and Territory in the Spartan Mediterranean* (Cambridge, forthcoming).

104 Arist. *Pol.* 5. 1306b 37-1307a 1.

105 Cf. Forrest 1968. 51; Spahn 1977. 101f., 109f.

106 See, e.g., Finley 1968; Oliva 1971. 29-32; Sealey 1976. 78-80; Murray 1983. 166-72.

107 Forrest 1968. 61; Cartledge 1979. 123-25. For status distinctions among the Spartiates (the elusive *hypomeiones*), see Kahrstedt 1922. 50f.; Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 659.

108 For discussion of authenticity, date and content, see, among others, Busolt 1920. 43-52; H.T. Wade-Gery, "The Spartan Rhetra in Plutarch, *Lycurgus* VI," *CQ* 37 (1943) 62-72; 38 (1944) 1-9, 115-26 = id. *Essays* (n.85) 37-85; A. Andrewes, *Probouleusis: Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Government* (Oxford 1954) 16-19; W.G. Forrest, "The Date of the Lykourgan Reforms in Sparta," *Phoenix* 17 (1963) 157-79; id. 1968. 40-60; A.H.M. Jones, "The Lycurgan Rhetra," in *Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies pres. to Victor Ehrenberg* (Oxford 1966) 165-75; R. Sealey, "Probouleusis and the Sovereign Assembly," *CSCA* 2 (1969) 247-69, at 250-57; id. 1976. 74-78 (opposes authenticity); Oliva 1971. 71-102; Jeffery 1976. 117f.; Cartledge 1979. 131-35; Murray 1983. 159-64; F. Ruzé, "Le conseil et l'assemblée dans la Grande Rhètra de Sparte," *REG* 104 (1991) 15-30.

109 Talbert's transl. (modified).

110 The last section (in square brackets), which is given only by Diod. 7.12.6, not by Plut. *Lys.* 6.10, is considered spurious by most scholars; but see, e.g., Bringmann 1975. 519f.

111 On the puzzle of the epithet and the significance of this cult, see J.H. Oliver, *Demokratia, the Gods, and the Free World* (Baltimore 1960), ch.1, with my critical comments (Raaflaub 1985. 125f., 140-44); Oliva 1971. 77f.; Cartledge 1979. 101.

112 *Phylai*: e.g., Forrest 1968. 30; Cartledge 1979. 93f. *Obai*: e.g., Forrest 1968. 42-46, 66f.; Cartledge 1979. 107. A different (and, I think, more plausible) explanation is proposed by Roussel 1976. 233-45; accepted, e.g., by Welwei 1979. 193f. See also Kiechle 1963. 150-52.

113 *Gerousia*, lak. *gerochia* (*geras echein*: to hold an honorary gift or portion); *gerontes* as in Homer, but in Sparta they had to be over sixty years old, beyond the age of military service. For discussion of the number, see Michell 1964. 137-39.

- 114** For details and sources: Kahrstedt 1922. 246-49; Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 679-82; Michell 1964. 135-40; E. David, *Old Age in Sparta* (Amsterdam 1991) 15-36; cf. Forrest 1968. 63; Welwei 1979. 182-84 against Bringmann 1975. 526-29. Election from among the upper class is confirmed by a combination of Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 10.1, 3 (with parallels in Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 680 n.1) and Aristot. *Pol.* 1270b 23-25, 1271a 9-12, 1294b 29ff., 1306a 18f.
- 115** On the title *archagetai*, see the discussion by I. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (Leiden 1987) 241-50.
- 116** For discussion of the puzzling dual kingship, see Kahrstedt 1922. 119-43; Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 672; Michell 1964. 101-4; Forrest 1968. 28f.; Oliva 1971. 23-28; Jeffery 1976. 114; Cartledge 1979. 103-6.
- 117** Cf. the good remarks by Roussel 1976. 236.
- 118** See below n. 124.
- 119** Murray 1983. 155f. offers some good observations.
- 120** Tyr. 4W = 3aD. 5-9; Plut. *Lyk.* 6.2 (with the app. crit. in Ziegler's Teubner ed.) and 6. For recent discussion of possible emendations, see Oliva 1971. 72-74; Bringmann 1975. 517 n.10; E. Lévy, "La Grande Rhète," *Ktema* 2 (1977) 85-103. For discussion of content, see the bibliography in n.108.
- 121** Moreover, there was only a collective voice vote, and even elections were decided by an "archaic" system of comparing the "decibel level" of approval evoked by each candidate; see now E. Flaig, "Die spartanische Abstimmung nach der Lautstärke: Überlegungen zu Thukydides 1. 87," *Historia* 42 (1993) 139-60. On the assembly, Kahrstedt 1922. 255-67; Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 691-94; Michell 1964. 140-46.
- 122** For discussion and bibliography, see recently R. Talbert, "The Role of Helots in the Class Struggle at Sparta," *Historia* 38 (1989) 22-40 (who opposes this view), and P. Cartledge, "Richard Talbert's Revision of the Sparta-Helot Struggle: A Reply," *Historia* 40 (1991) 379-89; more generally: J. Ducat, *Les hilotes. BCH suppl.* vol. 20 (Athens/Paris 1990). For the effects of a comparable phenomenon on archaic Rome, triggered there by intense outside (enemy) pressure over an exceptionally long period, see K. Raaflaub, "Freiheit in Athen und Rom: Ein Beispiel divergierender politischer Begriffsentwicklung in der Antike," *HZ* 238 (1984) 529-67, at 552-63; id., "The Conflict of the Orders in Archaic Rome: A Comprehensive and Comparative Approach," in id. (ed.), *Social Struggles in Archaic Rome* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1986) 1-51, at 29-34.
- 123** The contrary view of A. Andrewes, "The Government of Classical Sparta," in *Studies Ehrenberg* (n.108) 1-17, based on 5th and 4th century evidence, hardly applies to the 7th and 6th centuries.
- 124** For details, see Her. 6. 56-60 with Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 671-78; Michell 1964. 101-18. From an unknown date, in a monthly exchange of oaths between *basileis* and ephors, the *basileia* was tied to the *nomoi* of the polis (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 15.7 and Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 677 n.1).
- 125** Thus, for example, Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 673, 675, 676, 679 and *passim*; Forrest 1968. 50; Roussel 1976. 235; Sealey 1976. 78.
- 126** For discussion of the emergence of "the political" and a "political sphere", although focusing mostly on 6th century Athens, see P. Lévêque/P. Vidal-Naquet, *Clisthène l'Athénien* (Paris 1964); J.-P. Vernant, "Espace et organisation politique en Grèce ancienne," in id., *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs I* (Paris 1965) 207-29; Meier 1980, part A = 1990, part I.
- 127** See W. Jaeger, "Tyrtaios über die wahre *Arete*," *SB Preuss. Akad. Berlin* 26 (1932) 537-68 = id. 1960 II. 75-114 and (in English) id. 1966. 103-42; id. 1965. 87-98; Stein-Hölkes-

kamp 1989. 123-25. See also the references to *polis*, *asty*, *demos*, *laoi* in 6/7D = 10W. 1f., 13f.; 21W. 15.

128 Referring to the Spartans' shared origins and descent, to the support of Zeus who himself gave the Spartans their polis (2D. 1-4 = 2W. 12-15), and to the crisis caused by the war and the demand for redistribution of land (Aristot. *Pol.* 1306b 37-1307a 2 = Tyrnt. 1W).

129 On *eunomia*, see A. Andrewes, "Eunomia," *CQ* 32 (1938) 89-102; V. Ehrenberg, "Eunomia," in id., *Aspects of the Ancient World* (Oxford 1946) 70-93 = id. 1965. 139-58; P. Steinmetz, "Das Erwachen des geschichtlichen Bewusstseins in der Polis," in id. (ed.), *Politeia und Res Publica. Beiträge... dem Andenken Rudolf Starks gewidmet* (Wiesbaden 1969) 52-78, at 60-71; see also C. Meier, *Entstehung des Begriffs 'Demokratie'* (Frankfurt am Main 1970) 15-25.

130 The Rhetra has been called "the first hoplite constitution" (Murray 1983. 162). This is correct insofar as the Spartans were probably using the fully developed phalanx by the time the Rhetra was adopted, but doubtful insofar as Murray is thinking in terms of the "hoplite revolution" (see below at n. 178). If what was said above (at n.48) about mass combat in the *Iliad* is correct and, as is likely, applies to early Sparta as well, many or most members of the Spartan *damoi* had been involved in their community's wars before (except for the poor who perhaps qualified now because of the distribution of *kleroi* in conquered territories; such distribution may have had the same effect as the *kleruchies* in the Athenian empire: A.H.M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* [Oxford 1957; repr. Baltimore/London 1986] 7, 167-77). The big difference was made, I think, less by the phalanx *per se* than by the fact that, due to Sparta's peculiar situation, this hoplite army assumed extraordinary and permanent importance for the community, and that all citizens were part of that army. A comparable case is provided by the Athenian *thetes* after the Persian Wars.

131 For Drakon's date (621), see Stroud 1968. 66-70; Rhodes 1981. 109. Solon was archon in 594. The question is whether he realized his reforms in (or around) that same year or, as some believe (e.g. Sealey 1976. 121-23) somewhat later. For summaries of the discussion, see Rhodes 1981. 120-22; Chambers 1990. 161f. These commentaries, as well as that by Manfredini/Piccirilli 1977 (on Plutarch's *Solon*), listing sources and modern scholarship, serve as excellent guides to all issues discussed in this section.

132 On the problem of the opening section of Aristotle's *Ath. Pol.* see Rhodes 1981. 15-30, 65ff. *passim* and at 4.2-5; Chambers 1990. 84-91, 154-58; on later Athenian tradition in general, F. Jacoby, *Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens* (Oxford 1949); on the controversial interpretation of some of the archaeological evidence concerning increases and decreases in eighth and seventh century settlements and population, see Snodgrass 1977. 10-14; 1980. 19-25; 1991. 11-16; Coldstream 1977. 109; Morris 1987 and 1991; for a brief summary (with more bibliography): Raaflaub 1991. 215-17. See also D. Whitehead, *The Demes of Attica 508/7-ca. 250 B.C.: A Political and Social Study* (Princeton 1986) 5-16; Snodgrass, *CAH* 3. 1 (2nd ed. 1982) 657-95; Andrewes 1982; Welwei 1992, part II.

133 The difference to Sparta's experience is obvious from a comparison of Solon 2D = 1-3W with Tyrnt. 6/7D = 10W. For brief discussions of these wars, see Andrewes 1982. 372-75; F. Frost, "The Athenian Military before Cleisthenes," *Historia* 33 (1984) 283-94; see also T.J. Figueira, "Herodotus on the Early Hostilities between Aegina and Athens," *AJP* 106 (1985) 49-74; id., *Athens and Aegina in the Age of Imperial Colonization* (Baltimore/London 1991) 132-42. On the war with Megara about Salamis, see Plut. *Sol.* 8-10 with Manfredini/Piccirilli 1977, 130-43. Claims on Megarian territory are perhaps reflected in legends about early kings: M.P. Nilsson, *Cults, Myths, Oracles, and Politics in Ancient Greece* (Lund 1951) 56ff. On the war about Salamis: A. French, "Solon and the Megarian Question," *JHS* 77 (1957)

238-46; Frost, *loc. cit.* 288f. On sixth-century expansionist policies resulting in control over territories beyond Attica's natural boundaries in other areas as well, see Figueira, *Athens and Aigina* 142-60.

134 See the discussions by Berve 1967 I. 42f. with II. 539f.; Sealey 1976. 98f.; Rhodes 1981. 79-84; Andrewes 1982. 368-70; Welwei 1992. 133-37.

135 For the date: above n.131. For general discussion, Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 800-17; Stroud 1968; Sealey 1976. 99-105; Rhodes 1981. 109-12; M. Gagarin, *Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law* (New Haven/London 1981); Andrewes 1982. 370-72; S.C. Humphreys, "A Historical Approach to Drakon's Law on Homicide," in M. Gagarin (ed.), *Symposion 1990: Papers on Greek and Hellenistic Legal History* (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 1991) 17-45; Welwei 1992. 138-46.

136 For discussion, F.E. Adcock, "Literary Tradition and Early Greek Code-Makers," *Camb. Hist. J.* 2 (1927) 95-109; Bonner/Smith 1930, ch. 3; C.G. Thomas, "Literacy and the Codification of Law," *SDHI* 43 (1977) 455-58; A. Szegedy-Maszak, "Legends of the Greek Lawgivers," *GRBS* 19 (1978) 199-210; Ruschenbusch 1983. 317-23; Eder 1986; Gagarin 1986. 58-80 (on whose analysis I draw for the following summary); G. Camassa, "Aux origines de la codification écrite des lois en Grèce," in M. Detienne (ed.), *Les savoirs de l'écriture en Grèce ancienne* (Lille 1988) 130-55; K.-J. Hölkeskamp, "Arbitrators, Lawgivers and the 'Codification of Law' in Archaic Greece," forthcoming in *Metis* 8; "Written Law in Archaic Greece," *PCPhS* 38 (1992) 87-117; id., *Schiedsrichter, Gesetzgeber und Gesetzgebung im archaischen Griechenland*, forthcoming in *Historia Einzelschriften*.

137 Meier 1980. 70-79 = 1990. 40-46.

138 According to Gagarin, the latter provide the vast majority both in the early laws known through epigraphic evidence (1986, ch. 4), and in early literature (ch.2). R.W. Wallace/R. Westbrook, *AJP* 110 (1989) 362-67, and K.-J. Hölkeskamp, *Gnomon* 62 (1990) 116-28, among others, express serious reservations.

139 Gagarin 1986. 78, 80; cf. Snodgrass 1980. 118-20. On the emergence of the concept of citizenship, see H. Reinau, *Die Entstehung des Bürgerbegriffes bei den Griechen* (Diss. Basel 1981); R. Sealey, "How Citizenship and the City Began in Athens," *AJAH* 8 (1983) 97-129; P.B. Manville, *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens* (Princeton 1990).

140 Eder 1986; cf. Snodgrass 1980. 121.

141 Gagarin 1986. 88f.; cf. E. Ruschenbusch, "PHONOS. Zum Recht Drakons und seiner Bedeutung für das Werden des athenischen Staates," *Historia* 9 (1960) 129-54, at 147ff., esp. 149-52.

142 Ruschenbusch, *loc. cit.* 153, who also thinks of military authority ("Befehlsgewalt"), but in view of what was said above about Athens' wars, this seems less certain. See also Sealey 1976. 105: In "pre-Peisistratean conditions the law of homicide may have been the field of activity in which the ordinary free man was made most aware of public power and of the unity of Attica."

143 See Hölkeskamp, "Arbitrators" and the other works cited in n.136.

144 See, e.g., the discussions by J.R. Ellis/G.R. Stanton, "Factional Conflict and Solon's Reforms," *Phoenix* 22 (1968) 95-110; Sealey 1976, ch.5; Rhodes 1981. 90-96; Gschntzer 1981. 75-84; Andrewes 1982. 377-82; T.W. Gallant, "Agricultural Systems, Land Tenure, and the Reforms of Solon," *BSA* 7 (1982) 111-24; Murray 1983. 180-85; Oliva 1988. 25-28, 50-53; Chambers 1990. 143-46; Welwei 1992. 150-206. More literature is cited in Raaflaub 1985. 54f., esp. n.107.

145 For the latter, see the collection by E. Ruschenbusch, *SOLODOS NOMOI: Die Frag-*

mente des solonischen Gesetzeswerkes mit einer Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte. *Historia Einzelschr.* 9 (Wiesbaden 1966).

146 Solon's language in the two poems leaves no doubt about this. See also the comment by Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 5.3. Cf. Starr 1977. 46ff., 52f.; id. 1961. 313f., 351ff., 358; Spahn 1977. 121ff.; Gschnitzer 1981. 60ff.; Lintott 1981. 34f.

147 The reconstructions provided by Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 2 and 5.1-2; Plut. *Sol.* 13, assuming a simple dichotomy between the few rich nobles and the many oppressed "serfs" (see the commentaries of Rhodes, Chambers and Manfredini/Piccirilli on these passages), obviously are based on Solon's own statements. Besides these two groups, however, there must have existed a large group of independent farmers who were perhaps threatened by, but not directly involved in this conflict: Rhodes 1981. 95; Spahn 1977. 135ff., 150ff.

148 M. Gagarin, "Dike in Archaic Greek Thought," *CP* 69 (1974) 186-97, at 192 n.41: "an apparent allusion to the opposition of *bia* and *dike* in Hesiod."

149 See the bibliography cited in n. 144 above and the commentaries on Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 6; Plut. *Sol.* 15; see also M.I. Finley, "La servitude pour dettes," *RHDFE* 4th ser. 43, 159-84 = "Debt-Bondage and the Problem of Slavery," in id. 1982. 150-66.

150 For the significance of this aspect, see Raaflaub 1985. 54ff., esp. 62-65.

151 Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 7-9; Plut. *Sol.* 18f. and the commentaries; M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1986) 5-15.

152 Gagarin 1986. 71.

153 Murray 1983. 185; on the attitudes of the elite: Donlan 1980, ch.3.

154 See W. Jaeger, "Solon's Eunomia," *SB Preuss. Akad. Berlin* 17 (1926) 69-85 = id. 1960 I. 315-37 and (in English) id. 1966. 75-99; id. 1965. 136-49; G. Vlastos, "Solonian Justice," *CP* 41 (1946) 65-83; Meier, *Begriff 'Demokratie'* (n.129) 15-25; Raaflaub 1988. 234-39.

155 Esp. Alk. 69, 70, 129, 130B LP, Campbell. Cf., on Alkaios, D. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1955); W. Rösler, *Dichter und Gruppe. Eine Untersuchung zu den Bedingungen und zur historischen Funktion früher griechischer Lyrik am Beispiel Alkaios* (Munich 1980); A.P. Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets: Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho* (Cambridge MA 1983), part 2; D.A. Campbell, *The Golden Lyre: The Themes of the Greek Lyric Poets* (London 1983) 99-107; Podlecki, *Lyric Poets* (n.101), ch.3; on *stasis*, Stahl 1987. 56-105; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989. 157-65 (H.-J. Gehrke, *Stasis* [Munich 1985] does not deal with this early period).

156 For the following section, see generally Heuss 1946. 45ff. = Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 68ff.; H. Berve, "Wesenszüge der griechischen Tyrannis," *HZ* 177 (1954) 120 = Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 161-83; id. 1967, part I, esp. 164ff.; M. White, "Greek Tyranny," *Phoenix* 9 (1955) 1-18; A. Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (London 1956); id., "The Tyranny of Pisistratus," *CAH* III.3 (2nd ed. 1982) 392-416; H. Pleket, "The Archaic Tyrannis," *Talanta* 1 (1969) 19-61; K. Kinzl (ed.), *Die ältere Tyrannis bis zu den Perserkriegen. Wege der Forschung* 510 (Darmstadt 1979, with Kinzl's own contribution); P. Oliva, "The Early Tyranny," *DHA* 8 (1982) 363-80; Murray 1983, ch. 9; Stahl 1987. See also Welwei 1992. 229-65; J. McGlew, *Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca NY 1993).

157 Solon 23D = 33, 32, 34W; cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 6.3, 11.2; Plut. *Sol.* 14.9; further Archil. 22D = 19W.

158 This is true especially, but not only, for Athens; see Stahl 1987; W. Eder, "Self-Confidence and Resistance: The Role of *demos* and *plebs* after the Expulsion of the Tyrants in Athens and the King in Rome," in T. Yuge/M. Doi (eds.), *Forms of Control and Subordination in Antiquity* (Tokyo 1988) 465-75; H.A. Shapiro, *Art and Cult under the Tyrants in Athens* (Mainz 1989); see also McGlew, *Tyranny* (n.156).

159 See n.140 above. There even seems to have been a pre-Solonian law against tyranny: Plut. *Sol.* 19.4; Rhodes 1981. 220-23.

160 Cf. Solon 3D = 4W. On Theognis' poem, see G. Nagy, "Poet and Tyrant: *Theognidea* 39-52, 1081-1082b," *CA* 2 (1983) 82-91; cf. id., "Theognis of Megara: The Poet as Seer, Pilot, and Revenant," *Arethusa* 15 (1982) 109-28, and "Theognis and Megara: A Poet's Vision of His City," in Figueira/Nagy (eds.) 1985. 22-81. On Theognis and Megara, see also the contributions by L.A. Okin and T.J. Figueira in the same volume; *ibid.* 309-21 a rich bibliography.

161 On the aristocracy, see generally L. Gernet, "Les nobles dans la Grèce antique," *Annales d'hist. écon. et soc.* 10 (1938) 36-43 = "The Nobility in Ancient Greece," in id., *The Anthropology of Ancient Greece* (Baltimore/London 1981, tr. from the French ed., Paris 1968) 279-88; M.T.W. Arnhem, *Aristocracy in Greek Society* (London 1977); Donlan 1980; Murray 1983, ch.12; Starr 1986; id., *The Aristocratic Temper of Greek Civilization* (New York/Oxford 1992); Herman, *Ritualised Friendship* (n.70); Stahl 1987; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989 (with bibliography).

162 For the sources, see Berve 1967 II. 558f.

163 See n. 140 above.

164 Xenophanes here focuses entirely on athletic accomplishments; by contrast, Tyr. 9D = 12W includes other aristocratic qualities as well (*charis*, the quality of a *basileus*, speech and *doxa*). See also Xen. fr. 1 (with emphasis on the *chreston*) and 3 with Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989. 125-27. For criticism of aristocratic values, see *ibid.* 123-33; W. Donlan, "The Tradition of Anti-Aristocratic Thought in Early Greek Poetry," *Historia* 22 (1973) 145-54; see also Donlan 1980, chs. 2 and 3; P.A.L. Greenhalgh, "Aristocracy and its Advocates in Archaic Greece," *G & R* 2nd ser. 19 (1972) 190-207.

165 Ehrenberg 1937 (citation: 155 and 93, respectively).

166 Starr 1986. 35f.; cf. 23, 35 (in Hesiod and the Homeric epics "the *polis* as known in historical days does not yet exist"). It is unclear why Starr recognizes "states" in *Hymn. Ap.* 30ff. (35). Although Starr operates with a definition of *polis* close to my own (36f.), he links the emergence of the *polis* proper with that of the state; thus his emphasis on "regular rules of procedure" (36) or a "clearly marshalled order" (23f.). In my view, to put it simply, the *polis* "crystallized" (Starr's term, 34 and often in ch.3) as a pre-state; in a second stage of development, it reached a more integrated form and as such achieved or approached statehood (see n.2 for discussions of this question). Moreover, I find in the epics much more communal action and a more important role assigned to the *demos* than Starr does.

167 Snodgrass 1987, ch.6; Donlan 1989. 20f. This combined model ignores the *ethnos*, out of which, according to traditional views, the *polis* emerged (see, e.g., F. Gschnitzer, "Stammes- und Ortsgemeinden im alten Griechenland," *WS* 68 [1955] 120-44, repr. in id. [ed.] 1969. 271-97; id., "Stadt und Stamm bei Homer," *Chiron* 1 [1971] 1-17). These traditional views seem to me incompatible with the position presented here and the recent scholarship it is based upon. I consider the political or communal role of the *ethnos* in the Dark Ages an open question; Starr 1986, e.g., 27, 37, 50f., is far too vague. For recent discussions, see Snodgrass 1980. 42-47; Welwei 1983, part II; 1992, part II; id., "Ursprünge genossenschaftlicher Organisationsformen in der archaischen Polis," *Saeculum* 89 (1988) 1ff.; C. Morgan, "Ethnicity and Early Greek States: Historical and Material Perspectives," *PCPhS* 37 (1991) 131-63; P. Funke, "Stamm und Polis: Überlegungen zur Entstehung der griechischen Staatenwelt in den 'Dunkeln Jahrhunderten'," in *Frankfurter Althistorische Studien. Koll. zu Ehren von A. Heuss* (Kallmünz forthcoming).

- 168** For suggestions, see, for example, Qviller 1981; Starr 1986, ch.3; Donlan 1989. 21f. *Ethnos*: see previous note. An important question that urgently needs systematic investigation is that of foreign (esp. Phoenician) influence on the process of polis formation in Greece. In view of large-scale Greek imitation of Near-Eastern models in the Bronze Age, despite different topographical and geo-political conditions, and of a wide range of Near Eastern influences in the archaic ("orientalizing") period (see my introduction and the contribution by H. Matthäus, "Zur Rezeption orientalischer Kunst-, Kultur- und Lebensformen in Griechenland," in K. Raaflaub/E. Müller-Luckner [eds.], *Anfänge* [n.45] XVII-XX, 165-86) this possibility must be taken seriously, but the modalities are still elusive. R. Drews, "Phoenicians, Carthage and the Spartan Eunomia," *AJP* 100 (1979) 45-58; F. Gschnitzer, "Die Stellung der Polis in der politischen Entwicklung des Altertums," *Oriens antiquus* 27 (1988) 287-302, at 293, 299-301, and M. Bernal (below) emphasize such influence; Snodgrass 1980. 32 considers it possible; Starr 1977. 101 and 1986. 42 argues against it. See also the discussion on Bernal's contribution ("Phoenician Politics and Egyptian Justice in Ancient Greece", 241-62) in Raaflaub/Müller-Luckner (above) XXIf., 394-404.
- 169** See also above n. 131 for discussions of demographic changes.
- 170** See Snodgrass 1980. 54f.
- 171** For a different (plausible?) explanation, see recently Morris 1991.
- 172** For earlier discussions, see C.G. Starr, "The Decline of the Early Greek Kings," *Historia* 10 (1961) 129-38 = id. 1979. 134-43; Drews 1983. *Contra*: Welwei 1992. 80 n.9 with bibl.
- 173** That Lefkandi was in fact less exceptional is proposed with great confidence by Deger-Jalkotzy (above n.42); see also P. Blome, "Lefkandi und Homer," *WJA* n.s. 10 (1984) 9-21; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989. 46f. (with bibl.); others, however, are more cautious: see, e.g., Fagerström, *Architecture* (n.42) 161.
- 174** See esp. Starr 1977, ch.6, whose term "semi-aristocrats", however, I find unfortunate.
- 175** *Od.* 14. 199-234; Theogn. 53-58, 183-92, 1109-14, 1117f. and frequent complaints about loss of status because of impoverishment. See above n. 161 and, on the formation of the aristocracy, the brief discussion (with bibliography) in Raaflaub 1991. 230-38. A comparison with Rome is revealing; see Raaflaub (as cited in n.122).
- 176** Morris' reconstruction (1987. 173-83) seems flawed by his narrow focus on what he perceives as a feudal relationship between the *basileis/agathoi* and their dependents (serfs, *kakoi*). In his view, what made the formation of the polis possible was the emancipation of these serfs so that eventually *agathoi* and *kakoi* as citizens stood above a new dependent class of slaves. Clearly, though, the polis was based on the integration, not of the former *dmoes vel sim.* of the *basileis*, but of the free farmers.
- 177** Cf., e.g., Frost, "Athenian Military" (n.133); Heuss 1946. 50f. = Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 76-78. Early Italy provides a good example: K. Raaflaub, "Expansion und Machtbildung in frühen Polis-Systemen," in W. Eder (ed.), *Staat und Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Republik* (Stuttgart 1990) 511-45, at 533-35; D. Timpe, "Das Kriegsmonopol des römischen Staates," *ibid.* 368-87.
- 178** For discussions of the beginning of the hoplite phalanx, see M.P. Nilsson, "Die Hoplitentaktik und das Staatswesen," *Klio* 22 (1929) 240-49 = id., *Opuscula selecta* II (Lund 1952) 897-907; H.L. Lorimer, "The Hoplite Phalanx with Special Reference to the Poems of Archilochus and Tyrtaeus," *ABSA* 42 (1947) 76-138; A.M. Snodgrass, *Early Greek Armour and Weapons from the End of the Bronze Age to 600 B.C.* (Edinburgh 1964); id., "The Hoplite Reform and History," *JHS* 85 (1965) 110-22; id. 1980. 97-111; id. 1986. 14-17; P. Courbin,

“La guerre en Grèce à haute époque d’après les documents archéologiques,” in Vernant (ed.) 1968. 69-91; Detienne 1968; P. Cartledge, “Hoplites and Heroes: Sparta’s Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare,” *JHS* 97 (1977) 11-27; J.B. Salmon, “Political Hoplitism?” *ibid.* 84-101; A.J. Holladay, “Hoplites and Heresies,” *JHS* 102 (1982) 94-103; Murray 1983, ch. 8; J.K. Anderson, “Hoplites and Heresies: A Note,” *JHS* 104 (1984) 152; P. Ducrey, *Warfare in Ancient Greece* (New York 1986), ch. 2; Connor 1988; G.L. Cawkwell, “Orthodoxy and Hoplitism,” *CQ* n.s. 39 (1989) 375-89. Generally on hoplitism: F.E. Adcock, *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1957), ch. 1; J.K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1970); V.D. Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (Oxford 1990); *id.* (ed.), *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience* (London/New York 1991).

179 Law of Dreros: Meiggs/Lewis 1969, no.2; Fornara 1983, no.11; cf. V. Ehrenberg, “An Early Source of Polis-Constitution,” *CQ* 37 (1943) 14-18, repr. in *id.* 1965. 98-104 and (in German) Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 26-35. More evidence will be found in the collection and analysis of all known archaic laws by Hölkeskamp, *Schiedsrichter* (n.136). Archilochos mentions *polis*, *politai*, *astoi* several times (7D = 13W.2; p.10D [*POxy* 2310, fr.1] = 23W.17; 36D = 49W.7; 52D = 109W.1; 64D = 133W.1; 88D = 172W.4; 109D = 170W) but gives no clue as to the nature and level of integration of these communities. For the following, see generally Starr 1986, chs. 4 and 5.

180 *SIG* no. 4 (3rd ed.); see Ehrenberg 1937. 152 = 1965. 89.

181 Snodgrass 1980. 41f., 1986. 13f.; Murray 1983. 118f. The demand for *isomoiria* (equal shares of land: Sol. 23D. 21 = 34W. 9; cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 12. 3) may have been influenced by colonial experiences. See also Arist. *Pol.* 1265b 12-16.

182 Starr 1986. 39.

183 Raaflaub 1985. 82-92, esp. 90.

184 See now Snodgrass 1986a on “peer polity interaction”, and the comments (with bibl.) by Hölkeskamp, *MHR* 5 (1990) 76.

185 Ruschenbusch 1983. 317-23, however, warns of generalizations and considers the number of such lawgivers very small. See also the works by Hölkeskamp (cited in n.136).

186 See Vernant 1962; Meier 1980, part A = 1990, part I; Raaflaub 1988, esp. 255-61; “Beginning” (n.66) 18-22.

187 Ehrenberg 1937. 157 = 1965. 94; Donlan 1989. 22-26.

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